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INTRODUCTION

G. E. Moore claimed that by gesturing
with his hand and saying,

"Here is a hand," he could prove that external
objects exist.

Against

the claims of traditional philosophers, who so
often seem to contradict

common sense, Moore hold that the common sense view
of the world is, in
its fundamental features, true; that the beliefs
of common sense are, f or
the most part, beliefs which we all know to be
true.

Many of Moore's

critics feel that traditional philosophical positions
cannot be so abrupt-

ly countered; and some believe that philosophical statements,
or arguments,
are not what toey seem to be, Moore’s included.

Philosophical views which

go against common sense have been interpreted as assertions that certain

ordinary expressions do not make sense, or as proposals that certain expressions should not be used, or should not be used in the ways they are

ordinarily used.

Moore has been understood to be pointing out situations

in which these expressions do have a use and make sense so as to refute
the traditional philosopher or to advise against his proposal.
I will attempt to show that those interpretations, both of tradi-

tional philosophy and of Moore’s philosophy, are mistaken.

I will also

formulate a me taphilos ophical thesis, with the purpose of clarifying the

relationship between Moore’s philosophy and traditional philosophies.
This paper contains two main sections.

In the first part, I will

examine Moore’s views on philosophy and on ordinary language, and his de-

fense of common sense.

I will show 1) that Moore believes that very often

philosophers contradict or go beyond common sense, or do both; 2) that

Moore’s appeals to ordinary language are preliminary to his defense of
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common sense and that the one must be
clearly distinguished from tho other;
3) that Moore defends common sense by noting
inconsistencies in the denial

of the common sense view and by claiming
that the beliefs of common sense
are certainly true and more certain than
philosophical principles; 4) that

Moore’s defense does not necessarily involve the
claim that common sense
beliefs are known without need of evidence (which
he sometimes hold) and
is compatible with the view that we do need
and do have evidence for

them (which he sometimes held).

In essence, Moore's philosophy is a demon-

stration that we can make common sense our touchstone without
committing

any philosophical errors.
In the second part of this paper, I will examine the views of

Moore’s critics.

Some critics argue that Moore’s proof of an external

world and the sceptical position it was intended to refute are not, as
they seem to be, empirical.

They believe that philosophical statements

are not empirical because no empirical evidence is, or can be, given for
or against thorn.

I will note that philosophers do often appeal to em-

pirical evidence and will examine the nature of this appeal.

One cri-

tic argues that philosophical statements are not empirical because philo-

sophical categories are not general names; any statement of the form "x
is a

_

”

in which

nificance range the same.

”

Tills

is a category, has its truth and sig-

peculiarity, it is said, shows that cer-

tain statements involving categories are not empirical,

I will argue

that this is not a peculiarity of all philosophical categories, and in

particular not of those which Moore’s defense of common sense involves.
Some traditional philosophers have believed that their conclusions are

necessary statements, not empirical.

This view, as one of Moore’s cri-

tics has shown, involves the traditional philosopher in an inconsistency.
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Some critics argue that philosophical
statements, Moore’s included, are verbal in import or that they
inform us about ordinary lan-

guage,

I will show that the first view is mistaken
and the second im-

plausible.

The related view, that any statement which
violates ordinary

language as false, is also mistaken.

P^^' 0S0 P^ ^- ca
1

~‘-

Some critics atterr.pt to show that

statements are really linguistic proposals.

clarify tnis view and argue that it, too, is implausible.

X will trv to

The related

view that, if philosophers are making linguistic proposals, their
proposals are useless, is also mistaken.
Finally, I vail propose a me taphilos ophical theory which clarifies the relationship between Moore’s philosophy and traditional philos—
ophy.

My view is tnat philosophers often use special criteria by which

to judge whether certain items belong to certain categories.

Moore has

shown that good philosophy can be done with the ordinary criteria.
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PART I

MOORE ON PHILOSOPHY, COMMON SENSE AND ORDIiiARY LANGUAGE

5

CHAPTER

I

MOORE’S CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY

A.

Common Sense .
Russell had invited me to tea in his rooms to

meet KcTaggart; and McTaggart, in the course of
conversation had been led to express his wellknown view that Time is unreal.

This must have

seemed to me then (as it still does)

a

perfectly

monstrous proposition, and I did my best to argue

against it... And I think this example is also typical of what (if I am not mistaken) has always been

with me, the main stimulus to philosophize.'"
This is Moore speaking, in his autobiography.

Presumably,

McTaggart ’s view struck Moore, then in his second year at Cambridge, as
"perfectly monstrous" because it seemed to go against common sense.
is not an unusual response to a philosophical, thesis.

This

Often people are

dismayed by philosophers' theses, and usually because they seem to go

against common sense, and are

,

in this sense, paradoxical.

They seem to

go against what everybody, or almost everybody, believes.

Throughout his career, Moors continued to believe that, often,
philosophers' theories did go against common sense; that

a

large portion

of philosophical 1 iterator's constituted a long and continuous attack on
1
G. £. Moore, "Autobiography," Paul A. Schilpp, ed. The Philosoph y of G._ E. Moo re (Evanston; Northwestern University, 1942),
pp. 13-14.
,

,
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common senso.

Moore's career as a philosopher is,
in large part, a de-

fense of common sense.

Ard his belief that philosophy
and common sense

are so often in conflict forms the
backbone of his philosophical style.

Moore recognised that the intuition
that philosophical theories go against common sense needs
precise formulation.

First, what-

does it mean to say that a certain
item is a feature of the common sense

view of the world?

Moore answers

Something like this:

That it is a thing which

every or very nearly every sane adult, who has
the use
of all his senses
to add;

And of which, for many centuries, it would have

been true to say
Let us call
acceptance.

2

.believes or knows,,. Does one need

thic?,

this?'*'

with A. R. White, the criterion of universal

This criterion is the only one which needs to be satisfied

in order for a statement to be a common sense statement.

The question

which Moore asks above indicates that what is included in the common
sense view of the world changes from time to time.

Elsewhere, Moore

assert-, explicitly, that the views of common sense change as we progress

in knowledge.
small,

At one

time,

people believed that the heavenly bodies wore

compared to the earth, and at comparatively short distances from

the earth.

But now these primitive views are rejected.

,r

V/e

should say

that we know they wore wrong; we have discovered that they were wrong;

and the discovery is part of our progress in knowledge.”

let while there

^G. E. Moore, Commonplace Boo k, Casimer Lewy, ed, (New York:
The Macmillan Co., Humanities press, Inc., 1962), p. 280.
^A. R. White, G_. E._ Moore , A Crit ical Exposition (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1958), p. 11.

.

?

sro those examples of change in the common
sense view, there are beliefs

of common sense which, as far as we know,
have not changed, e. „ that
E
there are a great number of material objects
in the Universe. 1 Simply
the face that a belief is part of the common
sense view does not prove

that the belief is a true one. 2

Further human experience and science

often show beliefs of common sense to be false.

Common sense dees not have a view on everything; nor does
the
common-sense view of the world amount to a complete theory about
the whole
universe.

Moore says, Ido not know that common sense can be said to
have

any views about the whol e universe; none of its views, perhaps, amountto
this.

Common sense does not havo a view about whether or not there is

a God or an aftei* life.

While an enormous number of people believe that

there is a God, many people do not; it is not

s.

belief which, now commands

universal acceptance.
There are certain characteristics which many belief's of common
sense share, though these characteristics are not criteria for a belief's

being part of the common sense view of the world,

Moore has drawn atten-

tion to the fact that many of those beliefs are habitually accepted, the
fact that certain kinds of inconsistencies flow from denying various com-

mon sense beliefs, and the fact that many beliefs of common sense seem
obviously to be true.-5

Another peculiarity of a number of items of tho

^G. E. Moore, S ome Main Problems of Philosophy (New York;
Collier Books, 1962), pp. 15-l6T~
O

A. R. White, onA cit.

.

p. 12.

^Some Ma in P roblems of Philoso phy , p. 14.
citation, Moore’s works will be cited by title.

^ Jbtd
-*A.

,

pp. 30-31.

R. White,

op. cit,

,

pp. 12-15.

After their first-
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common sense view is that what one of us believes
when he believes a par-

ticular item of the common sense view is not identical
with what another
of us believes when he believes the same item.
items are beliefs about oneself.

This is because these

When S believes, "My body exists," he

does not believe what R believes when R believes, "My body exists."

Thus,

the common sense view is not merely a collection of propositions 1
.

The common sense view of the world, then, consists of what each

of us believes in common with very nearly everyone else.

world is not simply a collection of propositions.
theory about the whole universe.

necessarily completely correct.
have progressed in knowledge.

This view of the

Nor is it a complete

Nor, according to Moore, is this view

It has changed from time to time, as we
Yet, Moore maintains, th 9 common sense

view of the world is, in its fundamental features, certainly true.

B.

Conflict Between Philosophy and Common Sense .

According to Moore, the important kinds of questions with which

philosophy deals are:
(1) Questions about the meaning of voids, phrases and
forms of expression: Analysis;

(2) Questions about Reality as a whole;
(3) A number of questions about human knowledge;

w

Still mors questions about what it’s reasonable for
us to believe and in what degree .^
I will not discuss, in this paper, Moore's conception of analysis.

It is

inot clear from his writings what, if any, relation he thought to hold

^Commonpla ce Book
2
(

New York:

,

p. 280.

EhjljBaoaabz, Casimer Levy, ed.
G. E. Moore, IebJtur£5.
Humanities Press, Inc., 19o6), p. 190.

.

^

«

.
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between common sense beliefs and philosophical analysis.

But I think it

is reasonable to assume that he believed that
common sense does not have

a view about whether any particular analysis is
correct cr not.

Moore uses the expressions, "Reality as a whole" and "the
Universe as a whole," interchangeably.

Moore’s examples of statements about

the universe as a whole are statements about what is in the universe
or
occurs in it.

Mooie believes that it is fair to include as questions about

tuo universe ao a whole, questions
kino, questions aoout what
sr.d

vie

o.f

the third, and perhaps the fourth,

know with certainty to be in the universe, 4

’

questions about wnat it is reasonable to believe is in the universe

Thus, Moore thought that the most important and interesting thing which

philosophers do is:

To give a general description of the whole of the Universe,

mentioning all the most important kinds of things which we know
to be in it, considering how far it is likely that there are in
it important kinds of things which we do not absolutely know to
be in it, and also considering the most important ways in which

these various kinds of things are related to one another.

For Moore, philosophy seems to bo a special sort of inventory of the universe, special because it is concerned with the mos t Important kinds of
things which are in the universe and because philosophers discuss their

questions "by a particular method."

While the sciences do not "raise these

^ Lectures on
Ph ilosophy , p. 1 75.
2

Ibid

.

pp. 181-2.

^Some Main Pr obl ems of Ph ilosophy

,

p. 13
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abstract questions themselves,

•<

they do raise and settle questions from

which answers to the philosophical questions follow.

What distinguishes

philosophy from science is its abstractness, and, primarily,
its method. 1

What interested Moore most about philosophy was the fact that
it so often went against common sense and science.

What is most amazing and most interesting about the
views of many philosophers, is the way In which they go be-

yond or positively contradict the views of Common Sense...
You will best realize what these philosophical descriptions
of the Universe really mean by realizing how very different

they are from the views of Common Sense. 2
Tne fact that philosophy so often seems to go against common sense is not
a fact which Moore discovered, and perhaps for most people this fact is

the most interesting fact about philosophy.

What is special about Moore

is that the initial shock and the initial feeling that philosophers must

be wrong never wore off; nor did his conviction that philosophers were

indeed contradicting common sense.

Among the beliefs of common sense, according to Moore, are the
beliefs that there are in the universe both material objects and mental
acts, that mental acts are attached to some bodies but not to others, that

mental acts are dependent upon changes which occur in our bodies, that matter is independent of our consciousness of it, that all material objects

^Lectures on Ph ilosop hy, p. 1?8.
some Main Pr oblems of Philos ophy , p. 14,

.

•

end mental acts are in time, and that
we know all of these things. 1
Thes® beliefs meet the criterion of
universal acceptance; they are
items in the common sense view of the
world.

But these and the other

items in the common sense view of the world do
not constitute a general

description of the whole of the universe.

Common sense does not say

that those are the only kinds of things in the
universe, or that we know
to be in it; nor, even, that there may be other
kinds.

itself, is not a philosophical theory.

Common sense, by

In order to convert the common

sense beliefs into a general description of the whole
universe, "we

should have to add one or other of two things

..

either

:

Everythin g in

the Universe. . .is either a material object in space, or an act
of con-

sciousness .. .Or else we might say;

Everything which we know to be in

the Universe does belong to one or other of these two classes; though

there may be in the Universe other things which we do not know to be in
2

it."'

o

Moore believes that the first view J is plausible, "at least as

plausible as many that have been proposed by philosophers," that the
second view is still more plausible,^ and that the second view, modified
so that it mentions the unsubstantial kinds of things, is the correct view.

But many philosophers have held that any such
this is very incorrect indeed.

And different philosophers have

held it to be incorrect in three different ways.
^
2

5 erne

vievj as

Mai n Problems of P hilosophy

,

They have

pp. 15-25

Ibid., p. 2?.

^V/ith the proviso that acts of consciousness may belong to beings
on other planets as well as on the earth.
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either held that there certainly are in
the Universe some

most important kinds of things

— substantia l

kinds of things—

to those which Common Sense asserts
to be in it.

ill

Or else they have positively contradicted
Common Sense:

have

asserted that some of the things which Common
Sense supposes
to be in it, are not in it, or else, that,
if they are, we

do not know it.

Or else they have dona both

;

both added and

contradicted.^'

Three examples of additions to common sense are the
views that there is a
God, that there is an after-life, and that there is
something in the uni-

verse besides material objects and acts of consciousness, but we
do not
know what it is.

Many people do believe that there

is a God and that there

is an after-life, but many people believe that we do not know
whether or not

thei e is a aod or an after-life, so that it is fairest to say that common

sense has no view on these points.^

Other views which go beyond common

sense are the views that there are an infinite number of attributes besides

extension and thought, that this is the best of all possible worlds, and perhaps that every change has a caused

The two main varieties of views which

do not add to but do contradict common sense are, first, the variety which
asserts that we do not know that there are material objects, and second,
the variety which denies that we can know of the existence of any minds be-

sides our own/
1
2

r

Also, if a philosopher merely denied that there are

S ome Main Problems of Philoso phy, pp. 29 - 30 ,
Ibid_._,

pp. 30-31.

^Lectures on P hilosop hy, pp. 174, 180.
^Somo Mai n Prob lems of P hilosophy

,

p.

32.

•

3

•
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material objects without adding that, e.g., there is a
God, he also would
bo contradicting without adding to common sense.

Finally, the third way

in which philosophers’ views have gone against common
sense, that of both

adding to and contradicting common sense, includes a number of types.

Berkloy be oh
oojt-cts.
ject:-,

a dcied

that there is a God and denied that there are material

Berkley claimed that he did not deny that there are material ob-

but ho also held that what he called material objects exist only

when we see them and are not all in the same space.

"I think, then, it

may fairly be said that Berkley denies the existence of any material objects, in the sense in which Common Sense asserts their existence."^

Other views deny the existence of material objects and assert the existence of an immense number of minds, in addition to those of men and ani-

mals, claiming also that these minds are not in space. 2

And still other

philosophers have denied that material objects, our own acts of consciousness, time, and space dc really exist; rather they are appearances of

something else, a collection of different minds, one mind, or something

which is in some sense mental or spiritual, but not one or many minds.
Mooro's picture of traditional philosophy is of

a

discipline

which through special methods has consistently and literally denied the
existence of--or denied knowledge of the existence

of— kinds

or classes

of things which are almost universally believed to exist, and has often

asserted the existence of certain things which are not universally believed to exist or are very rarely believed to exist.
^3om e Main Problem s of Philosophy
2

Ibid

. ,

3 Ibid.

,

p.

35

pp. 35” 3?

,

p,

32.

For Moore, the

moot striking thing about traditional
philosophy is the fact that it
goes
beyond and/or contradicts common sense.
Historically, there has been a
continuing conflict of claims between
philosophy and common sense.
And the sane is true for philosophy
and the special sciences.

Philosophers who have discussed what philosophy
is have often attempted
to give a definition which will ensure
that no question discussed by

philosophy will be identical with any discussed
by the sciences.

But

Moore claims that while the sciences do not raise
abstract questions,
such as, "Is Matter Real?," they do "raise and settle
questions from which
one particular answer to them follows

;

"

thus,

"it seems to me obviously

rather a subterfuge to say that in raising them it is
raising questions

wnich the sciences don't raise."

Though a philosopher does not talk a~

bout the stars, if he comes to the conclusion that there
are no material
objects, he is contradicting the astronomers; 1 he is
contradicting the

scientific conclusion that there were once on the earth "large numbers
of enormous reptiles, ichthyosauri and such like." 2
related to common sense.

Science is closely

The sciences "give us detailed knowledge about

particular oojccts of the kinds which I have been trying to define," namely those kinds of things which common sense says are in the universe,
"Mcs t of the special sciences confine themselves to some particular group

among objects of these. .kinds
.

;

and we believe that they have been very

successful in giving us a great deal of real knowledge about objects of
these kinds."-'
1
2

Each of the natural sciences gives us detailed knowledge

Le ctures on Philosophy , p. 178 .

Ibid .

,

p. 177.

'Some Main Pr oblems of p hilosop hy, p. 25.

-

15

about certain kinds of material objects.

History and biography give us

knowledge about the actions of different
men or collections of men
theii

aces of consciousness.

a

m

Psychology is concerned with the
mental

acts which we perform.

In the case of all these sciences, there
are, we
believe, an immense number of things which
are now defi-

nitely known to be facts; a great many

v.’hich

were formerly

believec, but are now definitely known to be
errors; and
a great many which we do not know and
perhaps never shall

know.

In all cur ordinary

‘talk,

in all newspapers and in

all ordinary books (by which X mean books o ther than
phil-

osophical books) we constantly assume that there is this

distinction between what we know, what we wrongly believe,
and what we are still in ignorance about... All this is,
I
think, certainly nowadays part of the belief of Common

Sense about the Universe.^

Moore’s position is that it is part of the common sense view
that certain kinds of objects exist, and that science gives us detailed

knowledge about these kinds of objects, material things and mental acts.

That these sorts of things exist is a consequence of scientific conclusions.

What is amazing and most interesting for Moore is the fact that

traditional philosophies very often contradict and/or go beyond both com-

mon sense and the sciences.
^Some Main Problem s of Philosophy

,

p. 25.
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CHAPTER

II

COMMON sense and ordinary language
Moore's numerous romarks about language
are scattered throughout
his writings.
Here I do not attempt to give a full
account of Moore's views
on language, but only to mention a
few of his views which are especially

relevant to the second part of this paper.
First, I wish to repeat a point noted by
A. R. White in his book

on Moore.

White claims that Norman Malcolm and others
have confused Moore’s

appeals to common sense with his appeals to
ordinary

language.

While empha-

sizing, on the one hand, that the philosophical
statements which Moore at-

tempts to refute go against common sense, Malcolm
claims, on the other hand,

that the essence of Moore's technique consists in his
pointing out that these
statements "go against ordinary language." 1

In another article, Malcolm at-

tempts to show that there is something wrong with Moore's defense
of common
sense by trying to show that he is really defending a queer use of language.

Malcolm says, "Moore's assertions do not belong to 'common sense,' i.e., to
ordinary language, at all." 2

White says,

Moore's recourse to ordinary language

.is mainly in-

tended to discover what a philosopher's view comes to when

put into ... ordinary language, and to indicate what in fact
are the beliefs of common sense by referring to what we all

ordinarily say.

Having established what is the philosophical

view and what the common sense view and the two conflict, he
1

cit., p.

Norman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language," Schilpp, op.

3*1-9.

2

Norman Malcolm, "Defending Common Sense," The Philosophical
Review, LVIII (19^9).

.
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can

c-hon

use tho appeal to the latter to refute
the

former.^
Moore's translations into the concrete are not
intended to show that philosophical views go against ordinary usage, but
rather that they go against

common sense.

Moore uses the fact that they go against common
sense to show

that they are false.

For Moore, the correctness of language and the truth-

value of a statement must be distinguished.

ly— in

"Thus using a sentence correct-

the sense explained (in accordance with the best English

Uoing it in such a way that what you mean by it is true

,

usage)— and

are two things which

ere completely logically independent of one another..." 2

Still, Moore often aid castigate philcsphers for using words in absurd
or improper ways

.

Moore often notes that philosophers have used "material

object" or "real" in such a way that denying that material objects exist or
are real does not involve denying the existence of blackboards and loaves of

bread.

Some have defined "material object" as an object which is independent

of perception.

justifiable.

Moore says, "I think myself that such usage is absurd and unIt seems to me a separate question whether material things are

real* and whether they're independent of perception."

seem

tc-

nads."

Other philosophers

say that "That is a blackboard" entails "That's not

Moore says,

"I say

my sense

a

colony of mo-

is the right one, and the others are

wrong and improper senses; but even if they're right, they're certainly dif-

Moore does not say that the usage is absurd shows the proposition

ferent."^

^A. R. White, on. c it.
2

G. E. Moore,

,

p. 7.

"Reply to His Critics," Sehilpp, op. cit.

^Lectur es on Philos ophy, pp. 16-17

o
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to be false.

He is most concerned to emphasize
that he is not using "mate-

rial object" and "real" in the ways
that some other philosophers have used
them.

The wisdom of this concern will become
apparent in the second part

of this paper where I note that some
philosophers have found it difficult
to believe that Moore is doing what he
seems to be doing.

When Moore asserts.

"Here is a hand; therefore there are material
objects," we might be tempted
to believe that Moore is being less than
candid, if we have not been fore-

warned that Moore's use of words conforms to ordinary
usage and certain

philosophical uses do not.
Sometimes Moore dismisses a philosophical view as a mere abuse of
language.

Discussing freewill, he says that some philosophe 2 \s seem to hold

that "our will can properly be said to be free even if we never can, in any
sense at all do anything else, except what, in the end, we actually do do.

But

th.uS

guage,"^-

view, if it is held, seems to me to be plainly a mere abuse of lan-

Note that Moore is not dismissing either the view that we have

freewill or the view that we do not have freewill, but a view about under
what conditions we can properly be said to have freewill.

Perhaps Moore

could have made more use of this argument than he actually does.

For exam-

ple, he could have similarly argued that some philosophers seem to hold that

we can properly be said to know something only if we can prove it; but this

view is

a "mere

abuse of language,"

"linguistic mode."

not prove. ^

Yet often Moore does not argue in the

Rather he claims that he can know something which he can-

Or, he clarifies what he is claiming, e.g., that we know that

^G. E. Moore, Ethics (London, 1912), pp. 202-3.
^G. E. Moore, Phil s ophic al Papers (New York:
p.

I'i8.

Collier Books, 1962)*

.
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there are material objects, partly by
distinguishing his assertion from the
assertion of another philosopher, say
Berkley, who he believes is using

vords in an improper manner.

Clearly, Moore did not believe that
all para-

doxical philosophical claims could be countered
with an abuse -of- language
argument.

For, as shall be seen below, he believed
that some philosophers

had made paradoxical assertions such as
“Material objects do net exist" and
" We

do not know that material objects exist," using
these expressions in the

"proper" way.

And it is these assertions which Moore attempts to
refute in

his defense of common sense.

Moore believed

tha.t in

general philosophical expressions are am-

biguouo and ordinary expressions are not.

When he uses a philosophical ex-

pression, he is very concerned about clarifying how he is using it and
dis-

tinguishing his use from others.

He is rarely concerned with clarifying on

ordinary expression and distinguishes understanding such an expression from
giving its analysis.

An ordinary

terra

may be, in a sense, vague.

body of the "missing link" a human body?
come a human body?

Was the

At what point does an embryo be-

At what point does a corpse cease to be a human body?

The difficulty of answering such questions shows that "human body" is, in a
.

sons©, ambiguous ^

But in most cases, we do understand what is meant by

"human body." "There isn't any ambiguity about the term 'human body,' in
the sense in which there is about 'material thing' or 'physical object."'

The special ambiguity of "material object" arises from the fact that phi-

losophers have used the term in different senses; they have not done this

^Moore uses the expression "in a. sense, ambiguous." Strictly,
the issue in question is one of vag ueness .
Ordinary expressions are sometimes vague, philosophical expressions often ambiguous

-

Vith "human body . 1

Moore believes that to can define
"material thing- in

the way that he is using it, by saying
that if there are human bodies, chairs,

etc., then there certainly are
material bodies.

tainly is one proper use of ... 'material
thing

'..

Ke believes -that there cer.which is such that a person

vho says 'there are human bodies, but there
are no material things' is contradicting himself, just as would be a person who
said.
hounds, but there are no dogs .'- 2

..

'There are grey-

Moore's definition is not arbitrary; he

does not believe he is making "Human bodies
are material things- an expression
for a necessary proposition, but that there is one
proper use of -material

body

accoraing to which this statement

is_

a necessary statement.

If this

is the case, then it follows that if there are
human bodies or hands, etc.,

then there are material objects.

If -human body," "hand," "chair," etc.,

are, in a sense, not ambiguous, then, it seems to Moore, his
definition of
•mateiial thing" is

'

really clear with the sort of clearness that is wanted

in philosophy.

For Moore, if a philosophical assertion is ambiguous, we should

attempt to discover what is really being said and then see whether or not
it is reasonable to believe what is really being said.

Ue can dismiss a

philosophical claim as a mere abuse of language only if it, as the assertion about freewill, completely hangs on an improper use of language.

In

his defense of common sense, Moore is first concerned with clarifying what
he means to claim by 'Material objects do exist."

Then, he concerns him-

self with denying that there are good reasons to believe that, e.g., every
'Lectures on P hilosophy , pp. 17 - 18 .
2

s

.
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physical fact is logically dependent
upon sons mental fact. 1

proposition is

o.no

The latter

which some philosophers have
probably meant to assert

by "Material objects do not exist."

For Moore, their assertions
cannot bo

refuted by pointing out their ambiguity,
nor can they be refuted with
an
abuse-of- language argument. What they
really meant must be dealt with as
veil as what they said (i.e., how they
expressed themselves). If „ philosopher uses "material object" in

a

way such that "Human bodies are material

o-jocus" is not a necessary statement, he
cannot be refuted by a claim that
he is misusing language

(although he is).

Rather, for Moore, a refutation

involves ascertaining what a philosopher's
position really is and considering whether or not it is a reasonable view.

White

up Moore's method:

suras

Inconsistencies with ordinary use mark

s

philosophical

doctrine as incorrectly expressed, misleading, and maybe absurd; inconsistencies with the beliefs of common sense
mark

it

a.>

false. .Finally* if
.

t.

pliilos opher

*

Vj.ews,

when clearly

understood, are found consistent with the beliefs of common
sense, they are to be sccepted as true.^

Ph il o s oph 1 Ceil. Papers
2

A. R. White

,

pp

t

op. p i t,

,

p.

39 , 45 .

34 .
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CHAPTER

III

DEFENDING COMMON SENSE
A.

The

I^uistic

Preliminaries .

In the preceding sections I

have stated that Moore believed that
philosophical positions often contra-

dict or go beyond common sense; that
philosophical statements are often
ambiguous; that ordinary expressions are,
in a sense, not ambiguous; and
that whether or not a proposition is true
is independent of whether or not

it is correctly expressed.

defense of common sense.

These beliefs form the framework for Moore's
He first claims that he knows for certain a
num-

ber of c u .

on sense statements (not all) and that
these statements are not

ambiguous.

He then notes that some philosophers have held doctrines
which

contradict these common sense statements.

He emphasizes the fact that the

philosophical statements are ambiguous and is very concerned to make clear
that he means to refute these statements as they are most properly understood, i.e., as contradicting common sense.

Finally, he turns from lin-

guistic matters to considerations which are intended to at least incline
one to believe that the philosophical statements are false and the common

sense statements true.

Let us examine Moore's defense.

Moore begins with a long list of propositions, all of which, he
says,

"I know with certainty to be true."

There exists at present a living human body, which is my
body.

This body was born at a certain time in the past, and

has existed continuously ever since, though not without under-

going changes; it was, for instance, much smaller when it was
born, and for some time afterwards, than it is now..."*'

^G. E. Moore,

p. 33.

"Defence of Common Sense," Ph ilosophical Pape rs

,

"
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So the list begins.

And it goes on and on and on.

Next, Moore claims that

"very many (I do not say all)" human beings
have known propositions corres-

ponding to those in his list; i.o., not only does
Moore know that there now
exists his body, but he also knows that, ssy,
Russell, Ramsey, and Wittgen-

stein each knows respectively that his body now
exists, that the earth has
existed for many years, and so on.
Mooi

e

"Each of us" knows all these "truisms. 1

acknowledges that some philosophers have used the expressions

in his list to express propositions which they are not ordinarily
understood

to express, perhaps to express related propositions which these
philosophers

take to be true.

"I wish,

therefore, to make it quite plain that I was not

using the expression I used (in

ray

list) in any such subtle sense.

Al-

though Moore does not give any examples, we may presume that any philosopher

who uses "My body exists" to express a proposition about appearances or monads is using this expression in just such a "subtle sense."

Moore acknowl-

edges that some philosophers "are capable of disputing" his assumption that
there is a meaning which is "the ordinary or popular meaning" of the state-

ments in his list.

They seem to think that the question "Do you believe
that the earth has existed for many years past?" is not a

plain question such as should be met either by a plain "Yes"
or "No," or by a plain "1 can't make up my mind," but is the

sort of question which can be properly met by:

"It all de-

pends on what you mean by ‘the earth’ and ’exists’ and ’years.’
'""Defence of Common Sense," Philoso p hica l Papers
^

Ibid._, p. 3^.

,

p.

3^»

.

•
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If you nean so and so, and so and so,
and so and so, then
I do; but if you mean so and so, and so
and so, and so and so,

or so and so, and so and so, and so and
so, or so and so,

and so and so, and so and so, then I don't,
or at least I

think io is extremely doubtful,"
o.

It seems to me that such

view is as profoundly mistaken as any view can

be."^

Moore does noc mean to assert that all expressions have only
one

meaning or that tm-re are no cases in which we should have trouble
applying
an ordinary expression.

ambiguous .

As noted above,

"human body" is, in a certain sense,

Moore's point is that the statement, "My body exists," is not am-

biguous, per haps not even in the sense that the term "body" is.
we can imagine the case of Dracula

;

(Although

if there v;ere a vampire, "the living

dead," unreflected by mirrors, etc., could he truthfully say, "There exists
at present a living human body, which is my body"?J

God-Man could he say it?

before the crucifixion?

"missing link" could speak?

Could he say it?)

Or,

if Christ was a

after it?

What if the

Moore believes that each ex-

pression in his list "is the very type of an unambiguous expression, the meaning of which we all understand."

As far as I know, Moore never attempts any

more precise formulation of the sense in which ordinary expressions are not
ambiguous; we all understand them.

If a philosopher disputes this, Moore

believes that he must be confusing the question whether we understand the

meaning of such an expression with the question whether we can give
rect analysis of its meaning.

Moore's comments do not suggest that

^ "Defence of Common Sense," hil o s ophical Papers
P
2

Ibid .

•^Ibid

t

p.

37.

a

,

pp, 36-3?

cor-
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philosophers who have used ordinary expressions in
"subtle

A2 so facto, uttered falsehoods.

senses have,

Rather, Moore’s comments suggest merely

that their practice nay be illegitimate and the result
of confusion.
In contrast to the unambiguous statements in
Moore’s list, there
is a group of expressions popular among
philosophers which are "really am-

biguous," namely, "Material things are not real," "Space is
not real,"
’Tine is not real," and "The Self is not real,"

Moore acknowledges that

some philosophers nay have used these expressions to express views which
are not incompatible with Moore’s truisms and his cover-statement that each

of us knows the truisms.

With such philosophers, if there are any, I am not,
of course, at present concerned.

But it seems to me that

the most natural and proper usage of each of theso expres-

sions is

a.

usage in which it d oe s express a view incompatible

with (the cover- statement that each of us knows the truisms);
and in the case of each of them, seme philosophers have, I
think, really used the expression in question to express such
a vie;).

All such philosophers have, therefore, been holding

a

view inc omp a t ibl e with (mine )
Thus far, Moore has been concerned primarily with making his position clear*
The points which he makes after enunciating his truisms are linguistic, hav-

ing to do with the ambiguity or lack of ambiguity of expressions and the

logical relations between the propositions he takes to be expressed by

certain expressions.

He wishes to make very clear that in the way that he

is using the expressions,

1

"My body exists" and "Material things are not real"

"Defence of Common Sense," Philosophi cal Papers

,

p.

39*

^
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are incompatible, that he knows the former to
be true anc that at least
some philosophers have asserted the latter.

In all of this, we have nothing

except Moore’s testimony which should incline us to
either of the two incompatible views.

The linguistic remarks are preliminary.

We have a similar

state of affairs in Moore’s ’'Proof of the External World,"
in which a long

preliminary section is also devoted to clarifying what is at issue,

B.

Ilico^istencies

Moore proceeds to note certain inconsisten-

.

cies which arise when the beliefs of common sense are denied.

First, if, in

fact, any philos ocncr nas denied tne statements in Moore’s list (by
claiming,
e.g., that material oojects are not real), it follows (simply from the
fact

that he has denied them) that he must bo mistaken.

"For when I speak of

’philosophers’ 1 mean of course (as we all do) exclusively philosophers who

have been human beings with human bodies that have lived upon the earth,.." 2
if,

as Moore believes, what some philosophers have meant by, say,

"Material

objects are not real," is incompatible with what each of us believes when he

believes, "My body exists," then what the philosopher denies, in effect, is
that he (his body) exists.

imply that the philosopher

Put to say that a phi losopher has denied it is to
(

cum body) has existed.

To say that a philosopher

has denied the common- sense beliefs is, ipso facto, tc contradict the philosopher .

Secondly, philosophers have often expressed views inconsistent with
their philosophical views.

They have betrayed this inconsistency by alluding

to the existence of other philosophers and the human race, often by use of the
^

2

Philosophica l Pape rs
Ibid.

t

p.

3 8.

,

pp. 126-144.
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pronoun,

,!

we

philosophers

Moore doss not find this surprising because
he believos that
like everyone else, know the common sense
propositions to be

true.

The strange thing is that philosophers should have been

able to hold sincerely, as part of their philosophical creed,

propositions inconsistent with what they themselves knew to be
true; and yet, so far as 1 can make out, this has really fre-

quently happened.-*

What Moore thinks is strange but true, Lazerowitz called a paradox and could
not accept. 2

It involves the consequence (assuming that knowledge entails

belief) that philosophers have held contradictory beliefs.

A philosopher

faced with this accusation might attempt to defend himself; most likely his

defense would concern his use of language, either philosophical, or ordinary,
or both.

Moore would have to maintain his position that at least soma phi-

losophers have indeed hold common sense beliefs inconsistent with their philosophical beliefs

;

that the inconsistency is not merely apparent and due to the

expressions used.
Filially, philosophers who deny, not that the statements that Moore

claims to know are true

,

but that we know them to be true , e.g. philosophers

who deny that we know that there are material things and/or other selves, are
involved in a similar inconsistency by merely stating their thesis.
thesis is about

M us,"

tence of human beings.
^

This

or human knowledge , and therefore implies the exis-

Moore believes that these philosophers hold that there

Philos ophica l Papers

,

pr>.

40-41.

^oee Part II, Chapter 17 of this paper.

.
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ale human beings (that they know there
are) and at the same time

that no human being knows that there are other
human beings.

Here the phi-

losopher in stating his thesis is not only
contradicting other things which
he holds; the thesis is self-contradictory.

These philosophers may admit

thao they believe the statements in Moore's list,
speaking of such beliefs
as the beliefs of common sense, but deny that
they know them.

Yet, to say

that there are beliefs of common sense is to say that
many humans hold certain beliefs and this also implies that there are many humans.^
The fact that the first two types of inconsistency exist does not

ha/o as a consequence that the philosophical view in question is not true.
The third type of inconsistency involves self-contradiction in the thesis

itself, with the consequence that the thesis is not true.

way he is noting these inconsistencies
deserving of notice."

;

Moore does not say

he merely says they are "specially

White suggests that Moore believes that the exis-

tence of these inconsistencies (in part) makes it reasonable to hold that

common sense statements are true.-^

We have seen that Moore does say that

no philosopher has been able to contradict common sense consistently.

But,

perhaps, this merely suggests that common sense beliefs are compulsively accepted, that one cannot help believing them.

sonable?

Does this make the belief rea-

Moore, after noting the inconsistencies, asks, "But do I really
m

kno w all the propositions (in my list) to be true?
I

merely believe them?"

Moore does not suggest that the existence of the

inconsistencies makes his belief reasonable.
^

Philosophical Papers

^Ibid

,

-'White,

p.

Isn't it possible that

,

pp. 42-43.

39.

op. cit,

,

pp* 11-15.

He says,

"In answer to this

.

.
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question, I think I have nothing better to say
than that it seems to me that
I do know them, with certainty. nl

c

^PJ^ing..

*

Actually Moore does have something bet-

ter to say, or at least he has points to make
which may put his acceptance of

common sense in better light, make it more satisfactory to
a philosopher.

Sen-

tences like the above 3n which Moore merely insists that
he knows the common
sense statements to be true, may give the impression that
he makes this claim

for no reason at all, that it is an irrational assumption,
or that his words

disguise his method.
White suggests tnat Moore’s reasons for believing common sense state-

ments are not ol the evidential sort.~

White’s entire account is unclear be-

cause he does not distinguish having evidence, needing evidence, and giving
evidence.

White says that Moore accepts the common sense bel.iefs because they

are ’’ultimate.”

White’s conception of ultimacy is either both or only the sec-

ond of the following notions;
(2) cannot be proved.

(1) known immediately, i.e., without inference,

White seems

to believe that because com. on sense state-

ments are not provable, we cannot have evidence for them, and that Moore’s concern is to show that "oar claims on behalf of common sense are more reasonable
than any other.

White never says anything which is clearly false; but his

”

account is poor because of what he does not say.
^Philos ophical P aper s, p. ^3.
White, op . cit .
I'd id

,

,

pp, 18-19.

pp. 15 - 1 ?

am uncertain about this.
^White, op. cit .

,

p. 19.

Admittedly, interpreting

—
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Moore here is difficult because he changed
his mir.d about the status of our
knowledge of the common sense statements.
In 1910 Moore believed that our knowledge of
some common sense

statements

is immediate knowledge.

Knowing immediately is knowing without

inference, knowing a proposition without having to know 2
any other proposi-

tion from which at follows.

"But it is important to insist that even ’when

you do know a proposition immediately, you
some proposition from which it follows,"

may;

also at the same time know

Thus, Moore believes that a propo-

sition may be known both immediately and mediately. 3

Moore, here, is unclear

about wnether our knowledge of these common sense statements is only immediate or also mediate.

He says they are "only known immediately," but his fur-

ther comments indicate that they are also known mediately, and the "only" in

"only known immediately" may bo pejorative.*'
In 1925 ("Defence of Common Sense") Moore aeknovjledges that some

common sense prepositions are not known "directly:

that is to say, I only

know them because, in the past, I have known to be true oth er propositions

which were evidence for them."

An example of the sort of proposition he has

in mind is the one that the earth has existed for many years before Moore was
born,

Moore makes the epistemic point that though he does not know exactly

what the evidence is, this is no good reason for doubting that he knows the
^3uch as "This is a pencil."

%oore says "without knowing;" but this is probably carelessness
otherwise ho would be contradicting his own view that a proposition can be
known both mediately and immediately.
For Moore, if S knows
"'S ome Main Problems of Phil osophy
p. l4l.
to know p, but noneorder
in
inference
not
drawn
an
immediately,
need
have
3
p
theless he may have inferred p from some other proposition, Moore’s epistemic
principles will be displayed below.
,

^Ib'jq .

,

p, 141.

'
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proposition.
]oiow

"We are all, I think, in this strange
position that we do

many things, with regard to which we know further that
we must have

had evidence for them, and yet we do not know how we know
them, i.e., we
do not
Oftly

know what the evidence was." 1

Here Moore’s comments are directed

toward the more complex sorts of common sense beliefs and not to be-

liefs such as "Hy body exists."

But in 1939 » Moore goes a step further, suggesting that we do
have evidence for the simpler sort of common sense beliefs.
evidence,

our-

If we have

knowledge is not merely immediate.

How am I to prove
here’s another"?

no;*

that "Here’s one hand, and

I do not believe I can do it.

to do it, I should need to prove for one thing

,

In order
as Descartes

pointed out, that I am not now dreaming; I have conclusive
evidence that I am awake; but that is a very different thing
from being able to prove it.

my evidence is; and

I could not tell you what all

I should require to do this at least, in

order to give you proof.

Moore does believe he has evidence for "I am awake," but claims that ho is

not ablo to give his evidence.

Moore rejects the view that, if he cannot

prove "Here is a hand," he cannot know it,
ter of faith,

aid

must accept it merely as a mat-

"I can know things which I cannot prove.

G. 3, Moore.

Papers,
"Proof of an External World," Philosophical
“

pp. 43-44.
p

Philos ophlcal Pan e 1- 3
3 Ibid.

,

p.

143.
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Finally, in his notebooks of 1941-1942 (and
perhaps earlier),

Moore expressly rejects the view that he knows
such simple statements as
"That is a dog" immediately.

He admits that he does not infer them, but

claims that he knows them because he knows other
things; he could not know
them

vri

Inoat Knowing other things.

with "I’ve get a pain."
none for

trie

Here Moore contrasts "That is a dog"

Ho says that we have evidence for the former but

latter, or, if we do have evidence for the latter, we nonethe-

less know it independently of our evidence. 1

Crusoe spotting

a

Moore examines the case of

footprint and concluding that a

mail

has been there,

Cru-

soe’s knowledge that a man has been there, and perhaps his knowledge that

what he sees is a footprint are genuine cases of inference.

"But what we

have to consider is his knowledge that it is sand which is formed into that
pattern; this is what I was saying to Blake was not immediate.

That it's a

pattern in sand , not a hallucination of a pattern in sand, not an image of
a pattern in sand or a dreamt pattern in sand."^

he says "That’s a dog,"

Moore believes that, when

part of what he is saying is that it has another

side, is of substantial thickness, and isn't empty.

learnt from past experience.

These are all things

Therefore, his knowledge that that is a dog is

not immediate, because I only know it because I have learnt

by past experience that things that look like this always
have a substantial thickness and an inside.

If I only saw,

felt, and remembered what I do at this moment, I shouldn't

know that it was a dog:

this knowledge is due to my having

learnt by past experience how things generally behave... My
^Commonplace Book, pp, l?3-4.
•

V)lck

,

p 0 175*

grounds are

gej^alizati^

which I’ve learnt by past

experience; and I don't remember goners
lizations.-*Here Moore has taken a full turn from his
1910 position and believes that
we cannot know simple common sense statements
unless we know other things

It should be noted that Moore's epistemic
principles remain the
SfiiC.

I should like to list those which have boon
mentioned.
1.

S

knows p immediately

o 3

can know p without having evidence

for p.
2.

S knows p immediately

j.

S knows

k.

3 knows p mediately

5*

3 has evidence for p ? 3 can give the evidence for
p, or say

4

3 doe s not, have evidence for p.

p mere ly immediately
:>

3 does not have evidence feu* p,

3 does have

evidence for p.

what his evidence for p is.
6.

3 can prove p

a>

3 can give evidence for p,

or say what his

evidence for p is.
?.

"3 cannot prove p" is compatible with ”3 has evidence for p."

In 1910, Moore believed that he knew "This is a pencil" either merely
immediately or also mediately.

Perhaps by 1939 and surely by 1942 he believed

that he did not know "Here's a hand" or "That's

a

deg" immediately.

And, as

far as I can see, everything which is said in his proof of an external world

compatible with the view that we do not know "Here's

a

hand" immediately.

says he cannot prove it, but implies that he has evidence for it.

is

He

Ho does not

say that he could not know "Here’s a hand" without the evidence; but neither
does he claim the contrary.

dence for "Hare’s

a.

Moore's later view seems to be that he needs evi-

hand," that he h as the evidence, but that he cannot giv e

the evidence because he does not remember it.

The evidence is (at least in

part) generalizations about "things that look like
this" or "how things

generally behave."

note that even if Moore could remember these generaliza-

tions, he probably could not give a proof which would satisfy
some philos-

ophers, because such generalizations would assume the existence of
things,
i*e., external objects.
of,

if

not,

What would the generalisations be generalizations

statements about things?

Moore suggests that he knows that he is

sitting down and not standing up because he has learnt a generalization (causal)
from,

past experience.

But he asks, "How could I have learnt (this)?

Surely,

only if 1 knew on other occasions, when I had this kind of experience, that
was not standing up.

before knowin

g'

I

And it's impossible I should ever have know n this, if

it I had to know on other occasions that I was standing up.

It was problems such as this which in 1910 led Moore to claim that

common sense statements themselves are immediately known.

If one needed evi-

dence in order to know any proposition, then one would need evidence for one's

evidential propositions and so on.

He believed some proposition must be known

immediately, whether it be of the form "This pencil exists" or "The sense-

data which I directly apprehend are a sign that it exists."

He used such a

sentence as "This pencil exists" in his proofs of the existence of material
and external objects because he believed that they (or at least their sense-

data alternatives) "arc much more certain than any premise- which could be used
to prove that they are false."

for example.

They are more certain than Hume's principles,

Moore acknowledged that his argument may not be very convincing

^Commonplace Book, p. 186,
2
'Some Main Problems of P hilos ophy, p. 139ff.
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but claimed that it was a good argument, the strongest
possible. 1

We may

presume that even if Moore changed his mind about which,
or whether any,

propositions are immediately know, he kept his view that
at least many com-

mon sense beliefs are more certain than the principles which
philosophers
use to show they are false.
I think a fair extension of Moore's view, in the "casual
mode," is

that we can jus

^

as well start oil with the beliefs of common sense as
with

&ny of the solemn philosophical principles which arc supposed to be unimpeachable.

We can make common sense our touchstone without committing any

philosophical errors.

most certain anyway!

And it's the beliefs of common sense which really seem

Moore's linguistic remarks serve as preliminary clari-

fication, much needed clarification considering the uniqueness of Moore's
view.

His epistemic principles correct mistakes of other philosophers while

showing that his own view does not involve him in

ar.y

philosophical errors.

And it should be clear by now that Moore's acceptance of common sense is inde-

pendent of his beliefs about language.
principles

ha.ve

It is true that Moore's epistemic

their counterparts in statements about how epistemic words

are (or should be) used in ordinary language.

And Moore often refers to what

wo commonly mean by words, often epistemic words.

Finally, Moore relegates

what some philosophers seem to have meant by their assertions that, e.g., material things are not real, to a subsidiary position in his "Defence of Common
Sense

throwing against them only his claim that there is no good reason to

believe

thorn.

to suppose.

..

For example, he says, "I hold... that there is no good reason
that ever y physical fact is lo gica lly dependent on some mental

"Some Main Problems of Philosophy

,

pp. 142 - 3 .
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fact ..."

1

linguistic?

Is Moore's defense, then, off
the

mrM

to,

is it,

in some sense,

Does his claim that he knows for
certain that there are hands

dopend upon his ordinary and non-philosophieal
use of "know."

Does his

claii that Matter, Time, etc., exist,
really counter what any philosopher
has really intended?

The*, questions will be taken up in part
two of this

paper, which follows.

"

'Philosophi cal Papers

,

p,
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PART

J.T

SOME 1IIT3RPRSTAT IONS OF MOORE'S DEFENSE OF
THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS

SN3E;

3S

CHAPTER

IV

MOORE'S PARADOX

In the first part of this paper, I have examined
Moore's defense
ox

common sense.

Linguistic considerations were found to be
preliminary and

independent of Moore's acceptance of common sense as the
touchstone of truth.
Moore defends common sense and refutes traditional philosophers
by denying

philosophical statements which ho believes contradict common sense
beliefs.
If the philosophical statements

m

Moox e s refutation does not work,

question do not contradict common sense,

A number of Moore's critics believe that

the philosophical statements do not contradict common sense.

They believe

that philosophical statements are not what they seem to be, that if we take
there,

as Moore does,

to contradict common sense, a certain paradox arises.

This paradox, which Morris Lazerowitz calls "Moore's Paradox," is

Moore’s view that philosophers "have been able to hold sincerely, as part
of their philosophical creed, propositions inconsistent with what they themselves knew to be true.

„ .

Lazerowitz claims that is "impossible" that

philosophers have sincerely held propositions which they knew to be false.

p

Characteristically, Moore answers, simply, that there is no reason to suppose

that this is impossible.

3

Norman Malcolm finds the philosophical statements themselves paradoxical, in that they go against common sense, "a philosophically unsophisticated

^Morris Lazerowitz, "Moore's Paradox," Paul A. Schilpp, op. c it,
p. 374.

^Ibid

,

p.

380.

^ "Reply to His Critics," Pail. A. Schilpp, op. cit.

,

p. 675.

,
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person would find them shocking." 1

Koore would agree; but ne would add

that philosophers also should find them shocking,
because, according to
Moore, everybody knows the common sense view of
tbs world to be true.

While

Moore never used the term "paradox" in this connection,
his approach, as I
have noted, suggests an extensive conflict between
philosophy
sense.

arid

common

According to Moore, at least some philosophers have definitely
held

views which contradict common sense.

Some philosophers have held

"material

objects do not exist" in the sense which these words would normally be
taken
to have.

In this sense, the philosophical statement is empirical^ and in-

compatible with the statement, "There are pencils."
Faced with Moore’s paradox, Moore’s critics have concluded that

Moore was mistaken in believing that the philos ophical statements in question
are empirical.

3y examining philosophical statements in light of their juxta-

position to the beliefs of common sense by Moore, these critics have developed
not only interpretations of Moore’s method, but also accounts of the nature of

philosophical statements in general.

Malcolm claims that philosophical state-

ments convey information about ordinary usage, which usage
rect,

is ipso fac to cor-

He believes that Moore, in giving correct accounts of ordinary usage,

has successfully refuted philosophical statements which go against ordinary
On the other hand, Morris Laser owita, who also believes that philo

language.

soph leal statements are not empirical, argues that they are neither necessary

statements nor accounts of ordinary language.

He believes that they are,

instead, disguised proposals to change language and that Moore’s refutations

are not refutations, but rather counter-proposals to keep the linguistic

^Korman Malcolm, ’Moore and Ordinary Language,” Paul A. Schilpp,
op „ cit

. ,

p. 346.
p>

'Commonplace Book , p. 202.
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status quo.

Malcolm argues;

philosophical statements are not empirical,

they are mistaken accounts of ordinary language,
therefore they are false,

Lazerowitz argues;

philosophical statements are not empirical, they are

not necessary statements, they are not accounts of
ordinary language; rather, they are linguistic proposals, and, as such,
irrefutable (although

counter-proposals may be in order).

A third position, which Malcolm some-

times takes, is that philosophical statements are linguistic proposals
and

neans of an argument concerning polar terms.

Alice Ambrose

suggests another variation on the basis of an investigation of category
words .

In all cases, the interpretation of Moore corresponds with the ac-

count ol philosophical statements in general.

If traditional philosophers

are making linguistic proposals, Moore is making counter-proposals.

If tra-

ditional philosophical conclusions are verbal in import, so are Moore’s,
In the following chapters, I will examine, in further detail, these

views of Moore’s critics.

Ultimately, my aim is to clarify the relationship

between Moore’s defense of common sense and the philosophical views which
seem to go against common sense.

To accomplish this aim, an examination of

the nature of philosophical statements, along the lines of the one undertaken

by Moore’s critics, is helpful.

I

will ask, with the critics, whether philo-

sophical statements are empirical, or necessary statements, linguistically
informative, or verbal in import.
In what follows, the phrase, "philosophical statement," will often
3y "philosophical statements," I do not mean all of the statements

be used,

which appear in books of philosophy, but only those very striking ones with

which philosophers often express their conclusions.

Very often these

“dee Norman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul A. Schilpp,
on. clt.
pp. 345-6, where a fairly extensive list is given.
,

,

.

,

statements are generalizations such as:

All empirical statements are hypotheses.
All word s are vague.

A priori statements are

rul.es of grammar.

Sometimes they say of things of a certain

c__ass

that they are really of

another:

Material objects are really ideas.
Material objects are really events.
Philosophical statements are really linguistic proposals.
Often they assert that things of a certain kind

do not exist:

Material objects do not exist.
There are no temporal events
Or,

they deny that something is real:
Time is unreal.

Space is not real.

Sometimes they assert that a certain class of things doss exist:
There are propositions

Numbers exis t

Other statements concern perception or knowledge:

No material thing exists unperceived.
We do not know for certain that there are material objects,

inallv, many involve the concept of appearance or illusion:

Material objects are but appearances.
Tims is merely an appearance.

All is illusion.

b2

And there are many others:
The way up and the way down are the same.

Things are identical if they are indiscernible.

Nothing changes.

All is One.
Truth is the correspondence of thought to fact.

All of these are philosophical statements; although it should be noted
at
the outset that Moore was primarily concerned with those which deny the

existence or reality of things of a certain class and those which deny
that we know that things of a certain kind exist or are real.

My first

concern will be with the question whether or not philosophical statements
are empirical.

,
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CHAPTER

V

ARE PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS EMPIRICAL?
A*

V^iJL^ation.

One of the considerations which

Moore’s critics offer to show that philosophical
statements are not empirical
is the fact, according to them,

that philosophers do not offer empirical
evi-

dence for their conclusions, 1 or, even stronger,
that no empirical evidence
can be given, 2

Ambrose points out that philosophical investigations
are not

empirical, by which she means that philosophers have
no laboratories, cannot

claim to closer observation than other people, and do not
use experiments in
their demonstrations 1
ihe philosopher is often pictured as an armchair scientist, who,

without benefit of experiment, makes astounding claims about the

world..

While it is true that the philosopher may remain in his armchair, it simply
is not true that he does not appeal to empirical facts/'

dome times the em-

pirical facts are of a fairly sophisticated kind, and in these cases the

philosopher depends upon the scientist for his information.

A moralist may

appeal to anthropological and psychological facts; a political philosopher
to historical and sociological facts; an epistemologist to physiological

and neurological facts as well as discoveries in physics (e.g„,

/dorman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul
op« cit.

,

p.

that light

A,

Sehilpp,

360 .

^ Alice Ambrose, "Moore’s ’Proof of an External World,’"
Paul A® Sehilpp, op. c it, p. 402,
,

"Alice Ambrose, Essay s in Analysis (Hew York:
1966), p, 143.

Humanities Press,

^Roderick Chisholm, "Comments on the ’Proposal Theory' of Philosophy,"
Richard Rorty, ed.. The Li ngui stic Turn (Chicago: University of Chicago,
The following discussion owes much to Chisholm's discussion
p, 157.
of the same point.
.
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ta^es time to travel); and a metaphysician
may appeal to scientific facts
and theories concerning matter, evolution
and the brain.

Philosophers

also appeal to empirical facts which are common
knowledge, e.g., that sometimes people have hallucinations, that people are
sometimes misled by per-

ceptual illusions

,

that dreams sometimes seem real.

Finally philosophers

often appeal to autobiographical facts.
V.'hile

it is true that the philosopher does nit carry on investiga-

tions in the way that the scientist does, he does appeal both
to scientific
and commonly known empirical facts.

Ralph Blake notes that if metaphysical

statements are those for which wc could have no possible evidence, then
even

Spinoza

•

s

doctrine of a simple substance is not metaphysical, for he does

give evidence, although this evidence may have hardly any weight-. 1

Just

vnat part empirical facts play in a philosophical argument, how much weight
they have,
below.

ar.d

so on, are matters of great Importance and will be taken up

But the first point of note is that philosophers de offer empirical

evidence.

Why then do philosophical disputes continue through the ages?
Some of Moore’s critics claim that these disputes are unresolvable because

philosophical statements are unverifiable and that this fact
son to conclude that they are

r.ot

empirical.

is another rea-

Lazerowitz seems to believe

that the fact that philosophical disputes remain unresolved despite tho

counter-moves of the type made by Diogenes and Moore is reason enough to

believe that philosophical statements are not empirical.

Further, he claims

that "no known facts count against" philosophical statements, "no imaginable
1

Ralph M. Blake, "Can Speculative Philosophy Be Defended?"
Philos ophy cal Review L*J i (19^3) P* 12?ff.
,

•

k-5

or descnbable facts.

.

.Nothing we can picture to ourselves
would falsify"

the philosopher’s view.
be false, i.e., an

His proposition is not one which "could
imaginably

e^Jjcal

proposition." 1

Lazerowitz seems to be making

tne point, that philosophical statements are not
falsifiable, and concluding, from this fact, that philosophical statements are
not empirical.
scorns

He

tc believe that, if a proposition is not falsifiable (or
verifiable),

tnen it is not empirical.

This view is similar to the view of Ayer^ and

others that, if a proposition is not verifiable, then it is meaningless.

Chisholm points out, in answer to Lazerowitz, that "no one has yet succeeded in formulating a criterion of verifiability which will allow us to
say both tnat tno statements of science and common sense are verifiable and

that those of philosophy or metaphysics are not verifiable." 1

If no cri-

terion of verifiability is available, then verifiability cannot be used as
a

criterion for deciding whether or not

a

statement is empirical.

Still, Lazorowitz may be making the more limited point that while

empirical generalisations such as "All ravens are black" can be falsified by

empirical statements such as "Here is a white raven," there is no way of similarly falsifying a philosophical generalization.

Lazerowitz may mean that one

cannot falsify "There are no material objects," by producing a hand as Moore
lazorowitz must believe that the statement, "There are no ma-

thinks he can.

terial objects

,

"

is not to be taken in the sense in which it is incompatible

Morris Lazerowits, "Moore’s Paradox," Paul
p.

381"' 2.

Ayer, Language T ruth, and Logic, 2d ed.
Dover Publication, 1916).
^A.

U.S.A.:

A.

See also Alice Ambrose, E ssays in A nalys is, p,
*J.

,

Schilpp, op. c it .,
1*13.

(Victor Gcllancz;

^Roderick Chisholm, "Comments on the ’Proposal Theory' of Philosophy,"
Richard Rorty, on . ci t . p. 158.
,

with "There are hands."

It is true that, for the most part,
the evidence

which a philosopher offers is not in the
form of instances of which his

generalisations are generalizations.

A philosopher does not go from place

to place failing uo find & material object
here and there and then conclude

with a generalization of his findings:
if

there are none.

In spite of this,

in fact tne philosopher means his conclusion to be
incompatible with

common sense beliefs, then his conclusion can be falsified.

But the fact

that the philosopher aocs not proceed in the above manner may
be a good reason for suspecting that his conclusion is not falsifiable in the
way that

Moore thinks it is.
Besides the term "falsify," Lazerowitz also uses the terms "count

against" and "settle."

Lazerowitz finds it self-contradictory to say that

philosophical disputes with regard to matters of fact cannot be settl ed empirically.

"Count against" is a term which could have various specific

formulations.

against."

Vfe

found that falsification is too strong

a

sense of "count

Is there some other sense in which empirical facts,

other than the

sort which Moore presents, would count against philosophical theories?

Would

the fact that, due to medical advance, men became immortal, count against

philosophical theories of an after-life or existential philosophies concerning
death?

Does the fact that certain philosophers have appealed to false facts,

e.g,, that people with jaundice see yellow, count against their theories?

What if, henceforth, men cease to suffer hallucination or illusion and fail
If, after thorough investigation,

to dream?

the anthropologist concluded

that indeed there aro certain moral codes present in all cultures, would
this count against an ethical theory?
tions.

It is not easy to answer these ques-

Perhaps in most cases these facts could not be said to disprove a
1

Morris Lazerowitz, "Moore’s Paradox," Paul A. Schilpp, op.

cit._ ,

p.

4?

philosophical theory, but they would tend to
Influence philosophical
theorizing.
The problem is one of clarifying the
evidential relationship bo-

tween common sense and scientific statements
and their evidence on the one
hand, and philosophical statements and their
evidence on the other.

Per-

haps, it is even misleading to speak of
"evidence" for and against philo-

sophical theories.
the*

The facts which a philosopher cites do not seem to
have

same relationship to his conclusion as the facts
which a scientist

cites have to his conclusion, and we might wish to reserve
"evidence" for

scientific contexts.

But philosophers are notorious for ruling out kinds

of knowledge and types cf proof which do not conform to
a certain ideal.
For example , many philosophers have ruled out knowledge for which they

could find no deductive or mathematical -like argument,

In this century,

some philosophers have wished to rule out philosophical statements which

coulo not be verified in the way that scientific statements are verified.
V/e

might speculate that the ways people come to philosophical, common sense,

scientific and mathematical (or logical) knowledge, that is the kinds of
evidence or reasons offered and the methods of argument,
from one another.

are-

all different

One should not oxpect an argument for a scientific thesis

to be deductive; an argument for a common-sense belief to be deductive or

simply and strictly inductive; or an argument for a philosophical thesis to
always conform to one cf the other established methods of argument.

For now,

I will leave the question, of just how philosophical arguments work, open and

attempt

a

partial answer in the conclusion of this paper.
Tho other

vrltz

terra,

"settle," is also vague, in this context.

Iazoro-

believes that philosophical disputes cannot be settled empirically.

.

Moore believes that he has refuted
the view that there are no
external objects.
tled.

But, in fact, few philosophers feel
that the issue is thereby set-

On the scientific side, though, it
would be perhaps naive to claim

tnat it is ever settled, once and for
all, whether or not a scientific

theory is true.

New evidence may falsify the theory.

One after another,

scientific theories have been either rejected or
restricted.

Faced with

certain facts which might bo said to count against
the phlogiston theory,
some scientists who held the theory postulated
that phlogiston was a very

peculiar fluid in that it had negative volume— before
they eventually gave
up the theory.

Newtonian physics, which was at one time generally accepted,

2s now said to work only if the quantities in question
are of a certain or-

cer; strictly speaking, the laws of Newtonian physics, as
originally stated,

are false.
whci.t

How fac^s count against higher order scientific theories and in

sense scientific disputes are ever really settled are complicated is-

sues which should be taken up if wo are to distinguish clearly philosophical

from scientific arguments and conclusions.

In philosophy, there is no simi-

lar history of theories being rejected and restricted because of new empirical evidence.

Empirical facts do not bring about a consensus in philosophi-

cal thought, in bhe way that such facts do bring about consensus in scientific thought.

statements

These considerations may incline us to believe that philosophical
are.

not empirical, or are unlike other empirical statements.

Moore’s position that at least sometimes philosophers have meant their

But
con-'

elusions to bo empirical does not fly in the face of these observations about
philos oph leal h is t ory
A further view, which is not so much argued as implicit in the
arguments that philosophical statements are not empirical, is the view that

h9

only verifiable or falsifiable,
or scientific, or common
sense statements
firC " aC " Ual
alc: :bl says that the Phenomenalist
agrees with the common
man about the facts of the situation
ordinarily described as "seeing
a
*

tree." 1

i ‘‘

'

Ambrose claims that philosophical
statements are not tactual be-

cause philosophical statements are not
2
empirical.

As Chisholm points out.

thss is a criteriological issue which
leads to an impasse.
op.ui

If one phiios-

&U-S, for example , that unverifiable
statements are not factual and

another philosopher disagrees, they are disagreeing
about the criterion of
factualness.

Attention to specific cases will not resolve
the disagreement

because they will disagree about specific cases
also. 3

More will be said

about criteriological issues in the last chapter
of this paper.

The arguments considered heretofore revolve around
the notions of verification and evidence.

Another argument that philosophi-

cal statements are not empirical is perhaps suggested by
Moore's account of

metaphysics as an inventory of the most important kinds of things in
the uni4
verse,
Ambrose argues that the question whether external objects exist is
no
J.S

a

,

question ox inventory, not an empirical question, as Moore thinks it
ner intention is to show "that Moore's proof (of an external world)

not analogous to an ordinary empirical argument." 3

Norman Malcolm,
op . cit,, p. 337 .
2

ivS

It might seem, she says,

"Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul A, Schilpp,

Alice Ambrose, Essays in Analysis

,

p.

I4j,

Roderick Chisholm, "Comments on the 'Proposal Theory* of Philosophy," Ri chard F.orty, pp . ci t
p. 158.
.

4

,

See Cnapter I.

3 Alice

Schilpp, on. pit

Ambrose, "Moore's 'Proof of an External World,'" Paul A.
.

,

p , 406.

,
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that "external object" is a general name,
the most general of the series,

"dime," "coin," "external object."

But 1) one cannot "'point out an ex-

ternal object’ and thereby settle any question about
whether there is

a

thing of ohat kind," 2) one could not teach or learn
"external object" os-

tensively as one can teach "dime" and "coin" by pointing out
the object,
calling attention to its features and testing the pupil by having
him bring
the object in question; therefore, "'external object' is not a general
name

for some kind of thing, designating features distinguishing that kind of

thing from some other kind."^

Moore answers:

Now if "point out" is taken literally to mean "point

with the finger at," this may be true.

But in a sense,

which is, it seems to me, very relevant to our problem,
it is not true.

One can point out to a person an object

which is not an external object by the method. ..for finding.

. .

a "sense-datum.

Or, less controversially,

by getting hem to have an after-image.

An after-

image would also be the sort of object which is not spatial and not material.
Thus , an argument from os tensive availability will not work to show that the

terms of philosophical statements arc not general names.

But Ambrose has another argument to this effect.

She is arguing

that category words are not generic terms, not even the most general of
generic terms, as, for example, Wisdom believes:

"the most general genus

words, i.e., category words, are peculiar and are not related to their species

op.

cit,_,

^Alice Ambrose, "Moore's 'Proof of an External World,'" Paul A. Schilpp,
pp. 405-6.
2

p.

6?1.

G. E. Moore,

"Reply to His Critics," Paul A. Schilpp, o^_ cit.

"

,
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words just like other genus words are related
to their species words.- 1

In

the argument now under consideration,
Ambrose makes no reference to the phil-

osophically interesting phrases, "external object,"
"material object," "space
"time," "self,

"

but is concerned rather with

i-;hat

might be called the more

abstract terms, "individual," "property," "relation,"
"proposition," and "number."

ohe argues that these terms are not generic because
certain sentences

involving them have their truth range and significance range the same.
brose's position is illustrated in the following way.

Am-

Take a sample subject-

predicate sentence which may be said to inform us that a certain object belongs to a certain genus:

"x is a rickshaw."

When the term substituted for

x refers to a rickshaw, the statement is true; when it refers to chairs, airplanes, and other "real, objects" the sentence is false.

Other substitutions

for x, such as "2," "monarchy," "walking," "red," and "later," result in nonsense.

Substitutions for x, which refer to delusive rickshaw appearances,

make the sentence false.
"x is a rickshaw"

True for: rickshaws
}
1
False for:
other real objects)
True for: rickshaws
reality)
False for: delusive rickshaw ) appearance
appearances
) range
"2," "monarchy,"
"walking," etc.

.

^
)
)

significance
range

)

)

nonsense

)

This is contrasted with sentences involving category words.

The sentence, "x

is a thing," has its truth and significance ranges the same, if we consider

only real things, "real" in the sense in which it is distinguished from "appearance .
].

John Wisdom

"Moore's Technique,

"

Paul A. Schilpp, op. clt. p.

.

—

.

.
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"x is a thing"

True for

:

~~—

_

things

)
)

True for: things
False for:
shadows,
etc.

)
)
;

reality
range
realityappearance
range

)
)
)

.

_

significance
range

)

)

"2," "monarchy,"
)
"red," "perception," etc.)

nonsense'

Ambrose argues that since, within the reality range of values for
x in »x
is a idling," there are only values which make the proposition
true and none

which make it both significant and

false;,

tnat is, since from choosing with-

in this range we could not fail to establish the truth, "thing" is not a ge-

neric word like "rickshaw," and it is at least "doubtful that
the statement,

v;e

should call"

"x is a thing," empirical, as we would call "x is a rickshaw"

empirical.
If Ambrose is using "thing" in the sense in which only material objects or external objects may be said to be things, then her argument is direct-

ly relevant to Koore’s defense of common sense and proof of an external world.

But she often seems to be using "thing" in the sense in which it is synonymous

with the philosophical senses of "individual," "entity," and "object."

In

this sense, after-images, sense-data, platonic entities (numbers, propositions,

platonic forms), and God might qualify as things.

At one point, Ambrose refers

to Bradley’s claim that it is self-contradictory to say that things, properties

end relations exist; ^

if she means "thing" in the second sense discussed,

Bradley might answer that he did not say this of things, for he did bold that
one thing does exist, namely the Absolute,

*"

Alice Ambrose, Essays in Anal ysis, p. ?M 0

^Examples are discussed below.
3

Ibid.

,

p. 233.
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For

moment let us consider "thing" only
in the sense in which
it is synonymous with "material object"
or "external
the,

object."

Ambrose may

believe she is meeting Moore's objection to
her first argument (discussed
above) by distinguishing between a reality
range and a reality-appearance
range.

She admits that '"thing' functions like a
generic name to sot off

things from appearances." 1

But, for her,

is... to distinguish between different

"the function of a generic name

kinds of things," 1 and while she ad-

mits that "thing" functions like a generic term in
setting off things from

appearances

,

still she seems cot to want to adroit it as a
generic term be-

cause it docs not "distinguish among kinds of things

.

If Ambrose is us-

ing "thing" consistently as synonymous with "material object,"
what she
says, in effect, is that a term is a generic term
only if it distinguishes

among kinds of material objects,

'Material object" itself', as well as "sha-

dow," "mirage," "after-image," "dream image," and "hallucinatory image,"
are
not generic terms; and the sentences, "That is a material object," That is a

shadow," etc, are not empirical.

shadow" is certainly not

a

priori

But this is plainly false,
;

"That is a

"That is a material object" is clearly

contingent for what is referred to may be a ha?Llucinatory image.
ma.y

Ambrose

fina some advantage in reserving "generic term" only for those terms which

distinguish between kinds of material objects, but this predilection does not
seen

allow her to infer that "x is a thing" (whore "thing" sets things off

from appearances) is not empirical.

On the contrary, what she says is com-

patible with Moore's view that it is empirical,
^ Alice Ambrose, Essays in Analysis
2
3

Ibid,_,

p. 239.

Ibid ., p. 240.

,

p. 240.
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grad ® ° f abstra “ tion 85 "Proposition,"
"property," "relation," and "number." Ambrose calls all of these "category
«ords .
Moore believes that
there are, in the Universe, propositions,
but he is not concerned to show
that this is an empirical matter. Only the
questions of the existence of

material objects, space, time, and selves are
directly relevant to his defense of common sense.
fire

And, only if Ambrose can show that these
questions

not empirical, can she maintain that Moore's proof
of the external world

is not valid or is not what it seems to be.

Still, her discussion of the

more abstract category words is important for an understanding
of the nature of philosophical statements in general, for some philosophical,
disputes

have involved, these terms.

Wittgenstein claimed that ’’object," "complex,” •Tact,” "function,"
and "number" are "formal concepts" represented by variables and that the

propositions expressed by "There are objects," "There are numbers," etc. are
nonsensical*

2

Ambrose does not agree with Wittgenstein on this last point:
...it is not intended that translatability into the

notation of logic is to bo taken as a test of the sense or
nonsense of

a

corresponding English expression, but rather

that peculiarities which show up in the logical notation

highlight peculiarities of English,.,

3

^ There may be some question as to whether these are all category
words; but this question is not directly relevant here. What is relevant
is whether or not they are generic terms.

2

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tr acta.tus Logic o -Phlloso phi cus trans.
The Humanities Press, 19<$1),
D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuiness (New York:
p. 57 (4.1272).
,

O

"Alice Ambrose, Essays in

Aria lysis

,

p. 243.
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Wbat happens when one tries to translate

‘'There are

individuals "... into logical notation is
an indication of
the difference between.

.

.category concepts and generic

concepts
There are individuals" becomes

tautology.

3x|W)

,

or in some way, involves this

Similar tautologies can be constructed for "There
are qual-

ities," and "There are numbers:"

f f X y*, fa) and

.

3

The fact

that tautoloties result from attempts to express these
statements in logical notation may lead one to Quine’s position that our
logical notation may
be taken to express or presuppose an ontological commitment.

Ambrose finds

Quine’s position puzzling.

What is puzzling is not merely the divergence of
opinion

,

between him and Wittgenstein, over whether the

phrase "existence of individuals" makes sense,, but that
he makes no attempt to represent an ontological presuppo-

sition in logical notation.*

5

Quine probaoly realizes that ho cannot represent an ontological presupposi-

tion in logical notation.

His view is that one is committed to an ontolog-

ical position by the kinds of variables one quantifies over; thus, any expression. in logic?! notation expresses an ontological presupposition, pro-

supposed by a decision to use certain variables.

The presupposition cannot

*1

'‘Alice Ambrose, Essays in An alys is
2

Ibid_.

,

,

p.

244.

p. 245.

3

Ibi d..
p. 242, and Rudolf Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics and
Ontology,” Richard Rorty, op. cit. p„
,

,

/;

Ibid

. ,

p. 245.
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be represented by a sentence of logical
notation because any such sentence
would, presuppose an ontological
commitment.^

Perhaps the difference be-

tween Quine and Ambrose is that this fact does
not bother Quine but it does
bother Ambrose*

What bothers Ambrose is not so much the
non-translatability into
logical notation* but the peculiarity in English that
this non-translatability
is supposed to highlight.

This peculiarity is the identity of the truth

and significance ranges of "x is a thing" (here "thing” =
"entity"), "x
is

a.

quality," "x is a number," etc.

The claim, that this identity holds de-

pends on the claim that there arc no values for x which make these sentences
false.
thing,

And, finally, this claim depends on the claim that "Monarchy is a
T

"2 is a tiling," "ibis

(house) is a property," "Red is a relation,"

etc* are nonsensical, not false.

Whenever we cross categories or generic types in sentences of the
type under consideration the result is a sentence which rings nonsensical,

perhaps more so in direct proportion to the distance, so to speak, of the
one category or generic type from the other.

Sentences ring most nonsensi-

cal when we cross categories and less nonsensical when we cross generic typos

which are closely related.

We might construct a spectrum of nonsense:

"This

(dog) is a cow," "Rover is a stone," "Rover is an artefact," "Rover is an

after-image," "Rover is a number," "Rover is a color," "Rover is a size,"
"Rover is a capability," "Rover is a distance," "Rover is better than domocracy,

"

"Rover is a matriarchy," "Rover is a revolution,"

h.

V. 0. Quine

,

and Row, 1963), pp. 12-19.

From

£ Logical

9

Rover, need I say, is a dog.

We may be tempted

Poi nt of View (New York:

Harper
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to say that the sentences on
the

tear

end of the scale are false and
not non-

sense.

'Hover is a com" is the most likely
candidate for a false (significant)
sentence. Other candidates are:
"This (plant) is an aninal." "That
(natural
Stone formation) is an artefact."
Examples do not cc.nc easily, but the point
is that some sentences vhich may
be nonsensical in one situation
may not in

another.

A philosopher may find precedent here for
claiming that his asser-

tions that Hover is really an event, or an
idea, or a property (of the Absolute), or that numbers are entitles, are not
nonsensical, at least not in the

context cf philosophical discussion,.
Philosophers seem to think that it is a real question
whether or not

certain items belong to certain kinds in cases in which we
would ordinarily

think there is no question at all.
ther or not there are rickshaws
Thai 0 si u ricxsnaws

"

,

Philosophers have disagreed not as to whe-

but, as Ambrose notes, as to whether or not’

implies "There are things."'*'

Philosophers may very well

agree with one another about the existence of a certain item, yet disagree as
to which type under which to categorize it; they nay include the same items
on their inventory slip, but list the items under different headings.

One

philosopher nay list all rickshaws under the heading, "appearances," and leave

empty the space under the heading, "external objects."

One philosopher may

include all numbers under the heading, "entities," along with chairs, elephants,
and propositions.

Another may have a separate heading for numbers .

Ambrose

says that it is nonsense to say of a particular number that it is a thing, or
O

entity.

But this dees not seam obviously true.
'“Alice Ambrose, Essays in Arm lysis

^Ibid., p„ 256.

,

Compare:

p. 235*
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2 is a thing.

Rover is a thing.
The Empire State Building is a thing.

My lover is a thing.
Essays in Analysi s is a thing.

All of theo© sentences sound rather strange, perhaps because
we hardly ever
have occasion to use them.
In spite of these considerations, Ambrose's thesis seems generally

correct as regards terms to which the reality-appearance distinction does not
c

•

sentences of the forms, "x is a proposition," "x is a number," "x is

a property,

"

the same,

substitutions for x, which fail to make these sentences true, would

and "x is a relation" do have their truth and significance ranges

seem, in any situation, to result in nonsense.

Ar.d

this may be good reason to

suppose that "proposition," "number,' "property," and "relation" are not generi
terms and that whether or not propositions, numbers, properties, or relations

exist is not an empirical matter.

"Color," "size," and perhaps other te 2 'ms

might bo added to the list (although, apparently, Ambrose thinks that "color"
is a generic term^).

The arguments against the view that philosophical statements are em-

pirical, considered in this chapter, may persuade us that philosophers* methods
and arguments are very unlike scientists' and that some philosophical terms are

not generic terms.

It would seem safe to conclude that at least some philo-

sophical statements are not empirical.

philosophers have

used, those

But Moore’s modest claim that some

statements, which seem to go against common sense,

^ Alice Ambrose, Ess ays in Anal ys is

,

p. 238.
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m

senses in which they are empirical has
not met serious challenge.

Am-

brose’s attempt to show that categories
are not generic terms does seem
to work with regard to some philosophical
terms but not with regard to those

t° ras VM - Ca are involved in Moore’s defense
of common sense and proof of an

external world.
ii

let, Moore’s view would be seriously
challenged, perhaps,

ohe philosophers who asserted the statements
which seem to go against

common sense could hold consistently the view that
their statements are

necessary statements and not empirical.
the next chapter.

This possibility will be examined in

.
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CHAPTER

VI

ARE KilLOSOr JICAL STATEMENTS
NECESSARY STATEMENTS?
some philosophers, especially Bradley,
have given the impression

that their statements are to be taken
as statements of logical necessity.

Many of Bradley's arguments are to the
effect that certain ordinary propositions are self-contradictory.

Thus, when Bradley concludes that time is

unreal, Lazerovitz takes this to mean that
the concept of time is sell-

contradictory, or, in the concrete, that it is
logically impossible for
there to bo temporal events. 1

This would be a logically necessary state-

ment.
In the last chapter, I have noted that often philosophers
refer
to empirical evidence to support their conclusions.
ThQ.yij

It is also truo that

ph-lo^opners examine concepts and words in arguing for their conclu-

sions.

Zeno, Bradley and McTaggart are examples of philosophers who are

primarily concerned with the examination cf words and concepts.

Roughly,

logically necessary statements are those whose truth-value depends solely

upon the meanings of the concepts or words in the statements.

The fact that

philosophers very often concern themselves with the meanings of concepts or
words in arguing for their conclusions is evidence, although certainly not
proof, that their conclusions are logically necessary statements.
If Bradley's assertion that, e.g.,time is unreal, is a logically

necessary statement, then, at least sometimes, the philosophical statements

which seem to contradict common sense are not empirical.

Morris Lazerowitz

argues that this and similar statements cannot be necessary statements.

He

says that

^Morris Lazerowitz, "Moore’s Paradox," Paul A, Schilpp, op. clt .,
p . 383

,
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...understanding a sentence of the
form "x cannot..."
in which "cannot" has the meaning
of logical impossibility,
is inconsistent with knowing
what it would be like for there

to be states of affairs described
by "x does,.."^

This principle, as stated, appears
false, for it seems to me that we can
"Red cannot be a color," (and of course
we know that red is a

color) and we can understand "It is
logically impossible that there are

centaurs" (and we know what it would be like for
there to be centaurs).
Perhaps what Lazerowitz means is that the
proposition itself, expressed by
"x cannot..." is inconsistent with the
proposition that we know what it would

be like for there to bo states of affairs described
by "x does..."

That a

square cannot be round is incompatible with knowing what
it would be like
for there to bo round squares.

Similarly, "It is logically impossible that

there are temporal events," is inconsistent with the fact that wo do
know what
it would be like for there to be temporal events.
one counters that

vie

And we do know this.

If

know only what it would be like for there to bo apparent

temporax events, or appearances of temporal events, one is caught in a similar
inconsistency.

For, as Lazerowitz points out,

"There appears to be 0" implies

that it is logically possible that there is a 0.

'

"There appears to be 0,"

and "It is logically necessary that there are no 0’s," are incompatible propo-

sitions.

And Bradley seems to have held both that time is an appearance and

that it is logically necessary that time does not exist.

Even if Bradley’s statements are meant as logically necessary statements, they can be refuted with empirical statements.
J

If indeed it is an

Morris Lazerowitz, "Moore's Paradox," Paul A. Schilpp,

op.,

pit.

p. 38’\
O

‘"Morris Lazerowitz, Th e S truc ture of Kainphysic s (London:
and Keg ah Paul, 1955) » P« 20d.’

Routledge
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empirical fact that there are
temporal events, then it is false
that it is
logically necessary that there are
no temporal events.
If the philosphical
statements which contradict common
sense are to be taken as expressing
al_
necessary truths, this poses no
threat to Moore's defense of common
sense.
If, on the other hand, the
question whether or not there are temporal events simply cannot be settled
empirically, then Moore's defense of

common sense is threatened.

But I do not believe that anyone has
suggested

that this is the case.

Ambrose’s argument, that categories are
not generic terms, con-

m

sidered

the last chapter, may lead to the vie*
that a number of philo-

sophical statements are necessary statements.
on one lev;!,
An.,,

5,

.;

She suggests that, at least

Bradley’s statements are meant to express
necessary truths. 2

jtslieves,

if a philosopher, like Moore,

justifies his view that

there are things with a premise such as ”A house
is a thing,” then this latter statement is a necessary statement.

same would be true of "Red is

a

And, she seems to believe that the

quality,” and ’’North of is

a.

relation,” if

tnese statements were used to support the views that there are
qualities and

that there are relations.^
If philosophical disputes can oe envisaged,

at least in part, as

disputes about which headings under which to list certain items, as was sugges tea in the las

l-

chapter',

and if some of the headings are not generic terms,

eventually, she argues that since Bradley’s statements do not reflect
current usage, they are not necessary statements, but devices for altering language, Tads argument will be taken up in the following chapters,
2
3

Alice Ambrose, Essay s in Analysis
roid._,

p. 255.

.

p.

252.
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then it would seem that some of the so
disputes are about analytic matters.
The philosopher who claims that what seem
to be physical objects are really

events, ideas or properties (of tho Absolute

},

or that numbers are entities,

may be making assertions which are not nonsensical
statements but rather necessary statements.
statements.

Or at least the philosopher would take them to be
necessary

However, the view that, for example, Bradley believed
that it is

necessarily true that there are no temporal events, flics in
the face of Moore’s
paradox.

How could philosophers believe that statements which contradict their

common sense beliefs are necessarily true?

Faced with Moore’s paradox, some

philosopners have argued that statements which may seen to be necessary either
have linguistic counterparts or are really linguistic.
be presented.

These views will now

^

CHAPTER
ARl>

A-

VII

PLILO vOPHICAL STATEMENTS really about
language?

Verbal

5ll

£ffi£2±.

The views that philosophical statements

are not empirical and that they are or
seem to bo necessary statements

lead to the view that they are verbal in
import.

tirety is somewhat complex.

This view, in its en-

I will first present the view and then oriti-

cize it.

Ambrose argues that "in understanding a sentence
for a necessary

proposition and knowing what it expresses is necessarily true,
what one
knows is a verbal fact."

She elaborates with the following examples,

p:

"Material bodies are extended,"

Q

"There are no white crows."

:

In knowing p, one knows that "unextended material bodies" has no application,

In knowing q, one knows that "white crows" has no application.

are non-verbal facts.
ces

,

Thus far, the situation is the same for both senten-

But,

in knowing that the one sentence expresses some-

thing contingently true, one knows the verbal fact that
"white crows" has in our language a descriptive use and
the non-verbal fact that it applies to nothing; while in
Icnowing that the other expresses something necessarily

true,

ono knows- that "unextended material bodios" has no

descriptive use and one need know no non-verbal fact to
know that what the sentence expresses is true

1

Thes

Alice Ambrose, Es says in Ana lysis

,

.

pp. 153~^*
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Ambrose’s thesis may be criticised on
three levels.
thesis depends on her view;
and
i& a

First, her

a) that a phrase has no
application is a non-

that a Phrase has (or does not have) a
descriptive use
But this is misleading; neither of these
sorts of fact

—-Si*

has only verbal constituents, such as
a grammatical fact, or the fact that
two words » or phrases, are synonymous.

verbal constituents

a

Let us call a fact which has only

solely verbal fact

.

The fact that a phrase applies

to a (non-verbal) entity has as one of its constituents
a non-verbal entity.

Lot us call a fact which includes both verbal and non-verbal
constituents a
Xggfcjgl

£§££•

The fact that a phrase does not have application, the

sort of fact which "a" above mentions, is not a partially verbal fact because
it does not have any non-verbal constituents.

bal fact?

For

cur-

purposes,

it.

Should we call it a solely ver-

would be best to call a fact, whose negative

is a partially verbal fact, a negative partially verbal fact.
a

phrase has a descriptive use, the sort of fact mentioned in

The fact that
,T

b

9

”

is cither

1

1) the fact that there are no criteria for the application of the phrase, or
2) the fact that there could be entities of the sort to which the phrase re-

fers,

Beth of these sorts of fact include non-verbal constituents.

The first-

sore makes oblique reference to the people who have or lack criteria for applying the phrase.

The second sort of fact includes, as constituents, the enti-

ties which it says could exist.

Thus, the fact that a phrase has a descriptive

use is also a partially verbal fact.

Secondly, Ambrose

vulnerable to

^

lows

,

a

's

use of the phrase "descriptive use" may make her

charge of circularity or disguised triviality.

Chisholm points

Hero I cm presupposing my discussion of "descriptive use," which fol-

.

•

out that, While Ambrose’s argument depends
upon the distinction between

"descriptive use" and "application," she has
provided no definition or

explication of "descriptive use."
It,

for example, the term "descriptive use" were
defined by making
'o
**

use of necessity or contingency (e.g., "A phrase
may be said to

have a descriptive use if and only if there could be
something to

which it would apply"), Miss Ambrose "s argument would
hardly be
•

,
conclusive

1

If this is what Ambrose means by "descriptive use," then her
principle would be that in knowing, for example, that there are no
round squares,
ono knows that it is not the case that there could be round squares,
which is

trivially true and cannot. support the view that necessary statements are verbal in import.
Let us make some attempt to clarify what is meant by "descriptive
•use."

First, the term "descriptive" in ^descriptive use" does not make refer-

ence to the typo of adjectives and nouns involved.
are observation or sensation terms.

p

It does not imply that they

A phrase which has a descriptive use is

simply a phrase which has the form of a descriptive phrase ("a such and such"
or "the such and such"), which phrase "functions descriptively,"

A phrase

functions descriptively if understanding it entails knowing what it would be
like for there to be something (or some situation) referred to by the phrase.

If a phrase functions descriptively it has a descriptive use.

Thus,

"the pre-

sent King of France," has a descriptive use since we know what it would be like

for there to be a present King of France even though the phrase does not refer.

^Roderick Chisholm, "Comments on the ’Proposal Theory’ of Philosophy," Richard Forty, op. cat, p. 159
,

^Alice Ambrose, Fs s ay s in Analys is
between 10 and 15 " has a descriptive use.

,

p. 2j0.

Ambrose says that "prime

)
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But "a round square- has no descriptive use
since we do not know what it

would be like for there to be a round square.

A different way of putting

this is that there are no criteria for the
application of "round squares."
One might object that we do know what it would be
like for there to be

round square
0.1

or alternatively, that we do have criteria for
application

,

the phrase.

A round square would have no corners, four angles, etc.

Let me summarize.

There are three views as to what it is for a

phrase to have a descriptive use.
1*

A phrase has a descriptive use— Understanding the
phrase entails knowing what it would be like for
there to be something referred to by the phrase.

(Lazerowitz's view.

A phrase has a descriptive use “-There could bo
something to which it would apply.
gestion.
3*

(Chisholm's sug-

)

A phrase has a descriptive us

There are cri-

teria for its application.

According to

s.

2,

"Round squares" has no descriptive uses it is

not the case that there could be round squares.
Then, Ambrose's principle reads:

To know that there are no round squares is neces-

sarily true - to know that it is not the case that there
could be round squares,
which is trivially true.
According to 1 and 3> Ambrose's principle reads:
To know that there are no round squares is neces-

sarily truc~to know that there are no criteria for the

application of "round squares,"

3

:

)
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But-

there are criteria (no corners, four angles,
etc.).

self-contradictory

,

The criteria are

but then this just takes us back into the circle.

To

say that the criteria are self-contradictory is
to say that there could be
no round squares.
Finally, Ambrose’s principle itself seems not to be true.

Her

principle would allow:
1.

To know that "There are no round squares" expresses

necessary truth-to know that "round squares" has

a

no descriptive use.

Let "that ’There are no round squares’ expresses a necessary truth"=
"that ’round squares’ has no descriptive use"-^.

Let

Then, a consequence of 1

is
2,

know c<

3

knows

p

But there is a counter-example to 2.
a.

(Assume) 3 knows

fc.

S knows

c,

^

(3

p

s>

3

believes

believes p)

p

(This is the counter-example.

S

does

not believe either that words have or do not have a des-

criptive use; 3 is not a philosopher.)
(s believes B)o><v

d,
*\>

'V*'

‘

t

(
(5

S

(

knows p) (from b.)

(S knows r)

knows

d, ) *

n.f (

3

knows

p

Ambrose's principle does not work for someone who has no view as to whether
or not any phrase has a descriptive use.

In this section I have criticized Ambrose’s view that philosophical
51tatements, at least those which are necessary statements, are verbal in

.
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import.

The corresponding view that
Moore's refutations are also
verbal
1
in import is as strong or as weak
as Ambrose's view with regard
to philo-

sophical statements in general.

I believe I have shown that
this view is

mistaken.

B‘

^^soshical

---

Statements Inform Us About Ordinary lan
guage ?

Malcolm holds a view similar to Ambrose's.

While Malcolm does not have a

pr^w^oe argument to this effect, in general he
seems to believe that philo-

sophical statements inform us as to the correct use
of language.

Russell was saying teat
cl ^peaking to say tnat

it js really a

He says

:

more correct way

you see a part of your brain, than

to say that you see a postman.

The philosopher wno says that we never know material thing statements
for

certain
regards that form of speech ("I know for certain” ) improper... in just the same way that the sentence,

t:

X see some-

thing which is totally invisible," is improper."*
The reason "I see something which is totally invisible,” is improper is that
it is self-contradictory,

Malcolm believes that the philosopher is claiming

that certain ordinary expressions are self-contradictory.

He interprets Moore's

refutations to be simply statements to the effect that these expressions are
l\

correct language.

"Both the philosophical statement and Moore's reply to

Alice Ambrose, Essays in Analysis

,

p,

255

*2

Homan
OOr

Clt.

,

p.

3 XbicU.

4

Malcolm, 'Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul A. Schilpp,

35 0 •

Xbid,

,

P*

353.

p. 350.
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it are disguised linguistic
statements." 1
-.nt-rprctx

h.: ,«)

selj. -contradictory.

,,s

Malcolm believes that Moore (as

correct, that an ordinary expression
cannot be

By an "ordinary expression, »
Malcolm means "an ex-

pression which is ordinarily used tc
describe a certain sort of situation." 2
He believes that "a self- contradictory
expression would never be used to describe any sort of situation. " 3

For Malcolm, the point of a Moore-like
refu-

tation, showing that an expression dees
have an ordinary use, is to prove
1) that the expression is not self-contradictory
and 2) that therefore, the

^nxy ground for saying it is false must be
empirical evidence.

philosopher offers no empirical evidence.

nanly

But 3) the

Thus, 4) the expression, as ordi-

used, is true.

have snown that philosophers do offer empirical evidence.

Also,

sinpj.y does not ioxLovj that if indeed the
philosopher is not saying that

i.*

the ordinary expression is self-contradictory, that his
only ground for say^

-

i

false must oe empirical evidence.

His grounds for saying it is

false may be a combination of purported necessary truths and empirical evi-

dence

,

Another reason for rejecting Malcolm’s position is that it is pa-

tently false or at least implausible.

If Malcolm’s position is that the phi-

losopher is "really trying to toll us how people ordinarily use words," we may
-

Norman Malcolm, ’Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul A, Schilpp,

opy

cl't.

,

p.

35^.

.IbicK, p.

%ld.

358.
359.

t

p.

,

pp. 359-60.

Z, ,

Ibld«

.

71

answsr, with Chisholm, that "obviously
this is not the intention of the
statement." 1 Lazerowitz sees Malcolm’s
sort of interpretation as a spe-

cial form of Moore's paradox, namely that
philosophers
have been able to hold sincerely, as part, of their
philo-

sophical

ci cel,

views according to which expressions of

various sores, which they know arc used in ordinary discourse to describe real or imaginary states of affairs,
have no use or sense.

p

Ibis would bo a paradox because the philosopher knows the
expression has a
u^.,

c.

j

clams tuac io woes

not.

Malcolm's interpretation only moves the

paradox to another level.
Malcolm has an even stronger position that any philosophical state-

ment which violates ordinary language is false."’

The philosophical statement

is false no mattor what arguments may be advanced in favor of It!'

Malcolm

believes that by pointing out that we often utter sentences of the form "I
know p for certain," where p is a material- thing statement, Moore has refuted
tho sceptic,"’

Moore never said or meant any such thing, but the question re-

mains whether this would be

a

good refutation.

The obvious rejoinder, which Malcolm acknowledges, is that at one
time everyone- said, e.g., that the earth is flat.

Rorty, p o

,

"Roderick Chisholm,
p. 180.

Malcolm calls this a

"Philosophy and Ordinary Language," Richard

y

Morris Lazerowitz, "Moore's Paradox," Paul A. Schilpp, op. cit.

386

,

^Norman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul A. Schilpp,
Op_._

Clt,

,

p, 368.
if

Ibid

,

p,

350.

^IbicL..»

P*

35tff.

.

??.

mistake as to the empirical facts and
distinguishes it from a misuse of lan1
guage.
But the example he gives of a misuse
of language is a poor one because not analogous to the philosophical
cases in question.

His example is

that of too men confronting an animal (a
fox), agreeing on the characteristics of the animal and agreeing on what
kind of animal is usually called a

Presumably this means that they agree on what is
usually denoted by

for;.

"fox.”

But one of the men persists in calling the animal
a wolf. 2

How, this

case is dis analogous to the philosophical cases
because the intention of "fox”
is quite clear,

there can be no disagreement.

But we can easily imagine a

case more closely analogous to the philosophical
cases.

comes to Hew England and orders a milk shake.

that his drink contains no ice cream.
thj.s

(

man

is

Take the man who

He is indignant when he finds

"This is no milk shake?"

We feel that

not being absurd in the way that the man (above) who cries wolf

literally) is being absurd, because there is a reason for disagreement about

"Sr

intens ion of "milk shake.

Often the philosopher is very much like the traveler, coming from,
sav, the region of mathematics and visiting the region of science and common

sense.

He finds that the locals claim to be certain of things for which no

mathematical sort of proof is possible.

He tells them that they are wrong.

Now, if they inform him of the local customs, are they refuting him?

Norman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul
PP. c it

,

,

A.

Schilpp,

p, 3 56.
?

TDid,, p. 337.

-'The

man perhaps would be being absurd if, upon being informed about

local language customs, he persisted.
cial.

He would be being absurd, or very provin-

)

.
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Suppose
tau;'

tlio

epistemologist does use the word "cer-

incorrectly, he uses it, not as it
is ordinarily

1

nsec.,

but, say, to refer to a type of
cognition v.hioh

it would be logically impossible
for any man to attain.

Clearly,

futed him.
merly

me have pointed this out, we have
not re-

-./hen

In all probability his statement
v/hich for-

paradoxical now seems trivial.

seer.ec]

non see, what
saying is true
"

'
•

=

v/ilh

v/e

.

.

*

Indeed

had not seen before, that what he
is

.

laiter a»s

rs the- customer's "Eiis is not a milk

an explanation of the local usape it is
'because ho

B

in th

in -* 10

true; the waiter
3

'*

1

a

5.

«e

conclusion that

'
•

:

«

ttttoe “nil

s?

ake,"

uncle -stands

hake"

that

hat he ceil

,

raS

not refuting the customer,

should

:

y/e

notefa that th

’'This is

tenal-tmng statements

:

c<

side

.

tions k on!

ot lead to the

3

not a mill: shake," and «Uo are never certain
that
are true," are necessary statements.

ma-

Though, we nay

suspect teat the customer and the epistemologist arc
both working on assumpc.icno

cream,
c

•

i’

..

"

-ice.

^

icy

to be

necessarily true,

("kill: shakes contain ice

'hi iu ms logical iy possible that a statement is false,

y/e

are not

tain of it s truth. « "

nose
agr__.

"

»ake

3/3

as ump tions nay t lemseivos be false.

wiu*t j.alcolm,
S ivc

For

uvf J.j

a

,

at least in spirit.

And one would have to

For, perhaps,

the evidence we

statement’s being necessary nay be facts about usage,
tnere is always tie possibility that these assumptions are

n?0 being made, th: t indeed there is a disagreement about facts, that, e.g.,

Hoderac;

Forty,

o-.

,

c kk

,

C liso m,

p. 177.

"Philosoj

and Ordinary

L;

J

Richard
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tho drink has carbonation in it.

The epistomologist may be using "cer-

tain" -with its customary intension.

If so he is not using language in-

correctly, but disagreeing with most people about
a fact.^
In this chapter, I have examined two views that
philosophical

statements are linguistic.
is mistaken

1 have attempted to show that Ambrose’s view

and that malcolm's view is implausible.

Malcolm’s view is

really only an application of Ambrose's view to philosophical
statements
in general.

Ambrose argues that necessary statements are linguistically

informative, and Malcolm argues that the statements of Moore and other

philosophers are to be included among necessary, linguistically informative statements,

but x-ialcolm

’

s

view is highly implausible

;

it merely moves

Moore’s paradox to another level.
Roderick Chisholm,
Rorty, op. cit. p. 1?6.

’’Philosophy and Ordinary Language," Richard

,

2

See Chisholm’s arguments against psychologism and linguist theism:
Theo ry of* Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, 13. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1966), ppf 79-83.”

«

s
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CHAPTER

VIII

ARE PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS REALLY
LINGUISTIC PROPOSALS?
Faced with the fact that philosophers
like Bradley seem to
claim logical necessity for their statements,
and the resulting second-

level paradox, mentioned above, that philosophers
would then be holding
the view that expressions which they know

to

have a use, do not have a

use, Morris Lazerowitz concludes that
philosophical statements are really

linguistic proposals, or verbal recommendations.
Only by preventing ''temporal fact" iron having a

descriptive use, by preventing any phenomenon, actual
or imaginable from being called a temporal fact, does

"There cannot oe any temporal facts " become an expres-

sion

.for

a necessary proposition,

'

The philosopher’s argument "is meant to back a verbal recommendation. " 2

Moore

’

defense of Common Sense is a defense against changing the language of Common Sense; and his refutations
are simply counter-proposals, to be understood as recom-

mendations not to follow academic wishes to alter it.

3

In fact, Moore’s "’refutations’ are not refutations," and the philoso-

phers’ views "have no refutations .

morris Lazerowitz
P.

384
^

Ibid

a

^Ib lri .
4
Poid.

391.

,

p,

,

p. 393.

,

p.

376.

,

L

Laserowita s
1

view about what

"Moore's Paradox," Paul A. Schilpp,

or>.

cij

philosophical statements rosily
are clearly has different
consequences
than Malcolm's view. Malcolm
found the philosophers' statements
to be
and Moore's refutations to be
good ones. LaseroHiU's view
seems

&!£

consistent with holding that
philosophical statements simply do not
have
a truth-value, and therefore
neither are true nor have a
refutation.
Ambrose holds the same, or a very
similar, view.
con.._.u.,ioru,

If Bradley’s

are logically necessary, we can
treat them "as having only

vereal import... as reflecting usage."

But since "thing," etc. are not

"deprived by current convention of any
function," Bradley’s arguments

must be "devices... for altering present
language in a non-workaday
vay."

In a "revised language,” his statements
of existential denial

would express

a

necessity

2
.

I will attempt here,

guistic proposal."

first, to clarify what is meant by
"lin-

There are various kinds of proposals or
recommendations

which could be called "linguistic" or "verbal":

for example, the proposal

that Esperanto be established as a universal language,
or the recommenda-

tion of certain changes in the spelling or pronunciation
of English, or the

suggestion that certain rules of grammar be dropped.

The sort of proposal

wnuch Moore’s critics believe is being made by philosophers is the
sort

which Cells lor changing (or, on Moore’s part, retaining) the meaning
use

Oj.

a word (or words).

02*

Such a proposal could be made with regard to

intension, or denotation, or both.

a

,

7?

At

*

V

ohe P r °posal theorists
say suggests that

they believe that philosophers
are proposing changes merely
in the denotation of words changes merely in
what the word is to apply to.
Ambrose
,

says,

'’Bradley.

.

.stretch(cs) the use of 'appearance'
to apply to what-

ever thing-, quality-

and relation-phrases normally
apply to ...(Re is)
redrawing linguistic boundaries." 1
similarly, Lazerowitz gives the de,

pression that he believes Bradley to be
recommending that "temporal fact"
no lo^.^Oi apply to anything
£ ays

or that "now" no longer be used ,
^

Malcolm

that Ayer explicitly suggests that "known
for certain" is properly

applied only to a priori statements, 4 and
that similarly a philosopher

who says that all words are vague is proposing,
implicitly, that we &bolisn the use

of

"cmar

.

The impression one receives from these state-

ments is that the philosopher is recommending
a change in denotation, in
0

“

e'

-*-

n wnich usage is established, without any
corresponding change in

intension,

mis
one.

hie or;

,

if anyone hela it, would be a

highly implausible

The philosopher's proposal would be like the proposal that
"flat"

should apply

so

the earth*

Is is unlikely that we should call such a pro-

posal a "linguistic proposal."

And, if the philosopher were making such a

1 ,,,

Alice Ambrose, Assays in Analysi s

.

p. 25-4.

A

orris La
Morris
It
Lazerowitz,
zer owi
"Moore's Paradox," Paul A. Sehilpp, op. cit,
p. 384.

3r

P<

393.

'Norman Malcolm
354.

p-

h,Mw.

P*

364.

,
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propose!, ho Jaald look very
much like the man, in Kalcota's
example, who
callin 0 a fox a wolf for no
apparent reason. Ho acknowledges
that "fox" means an animal which
has characteristics v, w. and
x; that
"wolf" means an animal which has
characteristics x, y, and „ and that
the animal in question has
characteristics v, w, and x. let he insists
on calling it a wolf. Could the
philosopher be such an unreasonable fellow?
The answer is that he is not and that
the proposal theorists
knc-w he is not.

For despite the quotations above, one can
also find

statements by Moore's critics which indicate that
they believe the phi-

losopher is proposing a change in intention (as
well as denotation).

Malcolm says, "The reason that the philosopher makes his
paradoxical
statement... is that he is impressed by and wishes to
emphasize a certain
similarity. ..This linguistic device of speaking paradoxically.
of
. .does
course ignore the dissimilarities .. .which .justify the distinction
made
in ordinary language."
To., a

it is as if the man who persists in calling a

woli, does so Decause ho perceives the common characteristic, x; he

says, let us refer both to the animals which have characteristics v, w, x

and to those which have characteristics x, y,

z

by the term "wolf."

But

in doing so he changes the intension of the word "wolf," which now means
an anima?. which either has characteristics v, w, x or x, y,
is a characteristic unique to the class, volves-and-foxes

,

z.

And if x

then he is

recommending that "wolf" both mean and apply to all animals which have
characteristic x.

Woman Malcolm,
op. cit., pp.

"Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul A. ochilpp,

Or, perhaps it isn't merely this
similarity which provokes the

say what he does, but the fact
that he finds it difficult to distinguish wolves from foxes. He can well
enough tell the difference bo-

mar, to

,

twee, fox or wolf and a horse, but when
it comes to foxes and wolves, they

all look pretty much the same to him.
the case with the philosopher.

This is what Ambrose suggests is

"It is the fact that there are no cri-

teria distinguishing sharply between veridical
experience, illusion, hallucination, aii dream experience which the sceptic
uses to justify his

holding one can never know that hands, say, exist.

Here, the philos-

opher seems to be proposing a change in the intension
(as well as denotation) of "know" because there is no sharp distinction
between the cases in
whivii it doeo and does not apply.

"knowing

'

He may, for example, be proposing that

should imply the impossibility of being mistaken,
ihe most plausible view is that the philosopher is recommending

a change both in denotation and intension.

But note that knowing the in-

tension of a word does not necessarily imply knowing its denotation.

may know the intension of a word and not know whether
a

particular entity.

not it applies to

And a proposal may involve not a change in denota-

tion, but rather the extension of what a word denotes.

intension of "living,

or

We

"

Vie

may know the

"organic," and also know many facts about a cer-

or-

tain microscopic entity, and yet not know whether these predicates apply,

whether they denote this entity.

A proposal that they should denote this

entity would be a third sort of proposal.
mals going around each other.
1.

D vent around

2.

G went around D.

^ Alice

Moore takes

tire

case of two ani-

Two men claim, respectively,

G.

i
Ambrose , "Moore’s 'Proof of an External World,

Paul A. Schilpp, op. cit,

,

p. 413,

i

it

80

Here usage is not established.

The two men agree on the facts
of the

case and presumably on the intension
of "went ar oand.
as it stands,

correct,

"either usage is

dWo,

"

Moore believes that,

i.e. correct, but not definitely

He also believes that the men "are
not contradicting one another."

Sut they would be contradicting one another
if each man meant that his usage
is definutwl^

corim^ &s if the visitor to hew England persisted
in saying,

"That's not a milk shake,") and they would each be
making a mistake.

"They

night be recommending things" only if they meant
"that it should in such
cases

SS£& definitely correct to say" one or the other. 1

Such a re com-

mend a tier; wouxd call for an extension of denotation to
include cases for which
there is no established usage.

The proposal theorists, however, seem to be-

lieve that the philosopher's proposal is made in cases in
which usage is es-

tablished.

Otherwise Moore could not be said to refute the philosopher by

referring to tno established usage of ordinary language.^
But whatever sort of proposal tho philosopher may be said to be making, the question remains whether the proposal is that men in their ordinary

discourse should adopt this change?

Lazerowitz says

This.. .the philosopher undoubtedly docs not intend;...
It could be said that he is making an academic pro-

posal, for esoteric adoption only.

But again, it seems

closer to the facts to describe what he does as making
or maintaining an actual though academic reclassification.

Commonplace Book

,

3

pp. 196-201,

“See Chapter VII, B.

^Morris Lazerowitz, The Structure of Metaphysics

,

p.

104.

,
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Thus Lazerowitz concludes, "It Is

to characterize the

(philosophical) theory as a proposal," 3
Laze row its rejects his own proposal
theory for straightforward
reasons.

The philosopher uses

'-the

t .e.ot in chci.ng.un- giamnar book.

,

language of assertion,

-

he has no in-

and the reasons be gives for his con-

clusions are not of the sort usually given
for a proposed change, 2

Lazerowitz rejects the proposal theory because it
doesn’t quite fit the
facts.

The purpose of the proposal theory is "to
explain a number of

otherwise puzzling features" of philosophical
theory, 3 namely, what La zero-

wils calxs "Moore
Lazei'OWj.

’s

Paradox," and to explain the fact that, according
to

and others, philosophical statements are neither
empirical nor

l,z

necessary statements.

Commenting on the proposal theory, Moore says, "The

last ’therefore’ seems to me to be

a

simply enormous non-sequitor l

The

"therefore" he is talking about is the one of the proposal
theorist's conclusion.

The conclusion is meant as an explanatory theory, not logically

implied by the facts but, in some way, explaining them.
this explanatory theory, as with many others

,

The trouble with

is that the explanation is

as puzzling and paradoxical as what it is supposed to explain.

"Philo-

sophical statements are really linguistic proposals" has a paradoxical
ring very much like "Material objects are really collections of sensedata

,

n

1

Morris Lazerowitz, The Structure of Metaphysics

^Ibid
3

4

Ibid.

,

p. 104.

,

p. 103.

"Reply

to.

his Critics," Paul A. Schilpp, op

.

,

p.

3.03.

cit., p. 675.
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Before considering other possible
explanatory theories, I vlll
examine an argument which purports
to show that if philosophical
statements or arguments are linguistic
proposals (or reclassifications or
revisions), they are useless or improper.

Malcolm notes that philsoph-

ioal statements often involve polar
terms, i.e. pairs such as "large"
and "small," "animate" and "inanimate,"
"vague" and "clear."

According

to Ma] col.:, philosophers often are
proposing that we abolish the use of

one term of a pair.

Thus, the philosopher who says that
all words are

vague is proposing that we abolish the use of
"clear."

Malcolm responds

that by such a move, we would have gained
nothing; now "vague" would have
to do double duty, but it could not because it
would lack a contrary.

With oa b i^s polar mate "vague" itself would be useless
and it too would

be dropped.^

Malcolm

s

argument is bad because he misconceives what the phi-

losopher' o proposal would be, if indeed he were making one.

First, he

seems to suggest that the philosopher is banishing "clear" altogether.
C. K. Grant responds;

"Even if we accept 'All words are reallv vague,

all that follows is that we cannot use 'vague' and 'clear'
words

’

qua lify

to.

all the otner manifold uses of these polar terms remain unaffect-

;

ed."

Similarly, the philosopher whom Malcolm might suggest is banish-

ing "know for certain, "cannot be successfully countered by Malcolm's ar-

gument as long as he reserves "know for certain" for at least some
Hlorman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul A. Schilpp,
op_._

cit.

,

p.

y3\-.

2

in

II.

C. K« Grant, "Folar Concepts and Iletaphilosophical Arguments,"
D. Lewis, ed., Clarity Is Lot Enou gh; (London: Allei
win, 1963),

p. 2f>C.

'

:

,
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statements.

1

Malcolm might answer, e.g. in the
ease of "All wards are

vague," that, as regards words the
.
predicate "vague" becomes useless,
that as resards words it would have
to do double duty and could not,
for
th. fo

r

divination marked oy "vague" and "clear"
when predicated of

words would be lost.

Even if "vague" and "clear" be
disallowed a use as

distinguishing predicates, distinguishing
some words from others, it doe:
not follow that. Mvague" becomes useless.
ill indeed be useless for certain purp
oses
as a modo of distinguishing between
or of idem-

'

tiffing particular kinds of things... but it does
iiot

follow that such a predicate is useless for

all purposes.

Predicates may be used to remind,

or to make a formal point or to reject a conceiv-

class location, as well as to distinguish and

identify.

2

If anything, the polar terms argument should lead us to the con-

clusion that philosophers are net making proposals. Wouldn't it be silly to

suggest that people no longer distinguish between vague words (or expressions j and clear ones?

The proposal theory was supposed to explain Moore's

Paradox, which in this case would be the fact that the philosopher while

making a proposal, does not abide by or subscribe to it.

Moore delights

in pointing out places in which a philosopher who says that tine is unreal
n

'Roderick Chisholm, "Philosophy and Ordinary Language,"
Richard Forty, op ci t
p. 181.
-

2

f

-

JohnPassmo.ro, "Arguments to Meaninglessness, Preluded Opposites
and Paradigm Cases," Richard Forty, ed, o p. cit. p. 189.
,

,

8^

goes about using words like
"before- and "after," in ordinary
contexts.

Similarly one can surmise that Ramsey
would not object to someone's pointing out that a particular expression
is crisp and clear.
And these facts
are inconsistent with the theory
that philosophers are proposing;
changes

in ordinary language.
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CHAPTER

IX

PHILOSOPHICAL CRITERIA

Let me now review, in a general sort of
way, the path which is
taken by tne critics who have been discussed
in this part of the paper.
The critic's problem arises from Moore’s
defense of common sense and proof

of an external world.

The critic feels, perhaps, that traditional
philo-

sophical views cannot be refuted in the way that
Moore seems to go about
refuting them.
cl

He feels that something is going on beneath
the surface

tne dialogue between Moore and traditional
philosophers.

So he launche

into an examination of philosophical statements, an
examination which he
expo Cu<

v<

,„.j-

issue in some sort ol theory about what philosophical

ments really are.

tate-

He notes the sort of things which led Kant to say that

pnilos conical statements are synthetic a priori .

by which

s

lO judge

He has certain criteria

whetner statements are empirical or necessary statements

Since philosophical statements do not fit easily into either classification,
he feels that they are peculiar, he feels uneasy about them.

Perhaps he

feels so uneasy that he concludes they are somehow not respectable

x
,

Per-

haps he feels that philosophical statements are deceptive, they are not
-•hat

they seem to be.

They appear to be empirical; but in reali ty they

are not, since they are not like other empirical statements, they are dis-

similar to other empirical statements in important respects.

He concludes

that philosophical statements are not really empirical, they are real ly

something else.
ci

no

c

tic.

They are re ally such and such or such and such or such

i *

am thinking of the verificationist, although I have not discussed his view.

.

,
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Moore is reported to have said that
"when a philosopher says that
really something is so we are warned
that what he says is really so is
not
so realty

1,1

The path which Moore’s critics take
in examining philosoph-

.

ical statements clearly parallels the
path most philosophical investigate..

Tno crj.tac finds that philosophical
statements do not fit

easily into a certain classification; or he
is concerned that, to use Ambroso

’

s VJCrds

(° xxt of context),

"there are no clear distinctions" between

philosophical and scientific statements, that there
is the "possibility
of confusing"

'

them.

On the other hand, philosophical statements
are in

some ways similar to another sort of statement,
a linguistic proposal or

whatever.
-in

But nobody has ever recognized this similarity before.

The way

which philosophical statements are argued for, the language
in which they

are asserted, hides this similarity, it is a disgu ise

,

as it were.

The cri-

tic concludes tnat, despite this disguise, philosophical
statements are real iiZ

---

-nguiSuic proposals

2

,

A

Quote Malcolm (out of context);

o

"This lin-

guistic device of speaking paradoxically, which the philosopher adopts in
order to stress a similarity

,

does of course ignore the dis similarities

. .

The critic’s conclusion turns out to be as paradoxical as other philosophical

statements.

Cne is tempted to ask the proposal theorist,

mac, from now

"Are you proposing

on, we should cal 1 philosophical statements linguistic pro-

posals; are you making a linguistic proposal?"

But he says now that he was

‘‘Paraphrased by John Wisdom, "Philosophical Perplexity," Richard
Rorty, po. ci t. p. 104.
,

*Alice Ambrose, "Moore’s Paradox," Paul A. Schilpp,

otm_ cit._,

3

op

cit._,

'Norman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language," Paul
p. 363 .

I

A.

p.

Schilpp,

413

e?

exaggerating.

When he said that philosophical
statements are real^ linguistic proposals, he did not
mean that they mere linguistic
proposals
really
.

Instead of attempting to disrobe
philosophical theories, as it
w.--, l.t Us, a.rss, sun up
their interesting peculiarities.
Although
philosophers often appeal to both
scientific and commonly known empirical
facts, they themselves have no
laboratories, perform no experiments,
and
can claim to no closer observation
than other people.

With the same em-

pirical facts available, philosophers
may come to opposite conclusions;

philosophical disputes continue unresolved.

While empirical facts and

scientific theories do tend to suggest,
influence, and possibly discredit

philosophical theories, they do not clearly
disprove such theories; no consons us is brought
abort xn
in pn->-Losopnicd±
nhil osonV-ioai thought
+V
°
by empirical evidence, as

it

j.s

in science

.

(This is not to suggest that there is n ever
general a~

greement on certain issues or, broadly speaking,
acknowledged tendencies
or goals.)

Clearly

the

philosopher ’s conclusion, when it is a generalisa-

tion, as it usually is, does not issue from a
straightforward inductive ar-

gument.

A metaphysics is unlike a typical inventory in that philosophers
aro

r.ot

concerned with which items there are, but with, roughly speaking,

how to classify items, and with which types of items there are.

Philoso-

phers arc often concerned with the most abstract and general of types of
items, or categories, and these typos, or categories, are peculiar (though

no
ci.

'-'

u.v

n '.pie ) in that wnether an item belongs to one of these categories

is

ton an analytic matter (that a house is a thing, etc. is logically neces-

sary).

If a philosopher subscribes to a particular classification, a state-

ment he might make to the effect that a certain item belongs to

a certain

.
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category will sound very
peculiar
-J-ai
**

i-

,

01

poinaps nonsensical, as
will all

statements which cross the
usual categories
aie ° 0ries

'

+w
A11 v
+
though
to varying degrees.

Many philosophers examine
concepts end words in arguing
for
their conclusions.

Soce philosophers seen to
believe that their con^Iwsions are logically nece^
(-l.,,
“
"
though
s ome cases this would
be
inconsistent with other assertions
which these philosophers mete
(about
appearance). Necessary statements
do often appear in philosophical
arguments, and a case can be made
that seme philosophical conclusions
are
i

‘

»

necessary statements.

m

But perhaps the most noteworthy
fact about philo-

sophical statements is that often
the words which appear in them
are used
in unordinary ways.
The pnilosopner
° a °’

f

unordinary ways of speaking are now notori-

s

The fact that ths Philosopher uses
words in unordinary ways is per-

haps the primary datum which suggests
the various metaphilosophical theses
ve have been considering.

But, as Chisholm points cut, from the
fact that

people use words differently, it does not follow
that they have different
be„j_*.fs

cbouc

guage.

b-ay,

i.iia

..

is correct language , ^ or what should be
correct lan-

then, do philosophers use words in an unusual
way?

tion does not have one answer but many.
whiCi, words can do used,

science..
<..i

This ques-

There are many unordinary ways in

not only in philosophy, but also in poetry and in

In Philosophy and science, special terminology is often employed.
e

various purposes for special terminology and also various motives

that a philosopher or a scientist may have for employing such terminology,
I cannot hors attempt to give a full account of what is peculiar about philo-

sopnieal uses of terminology.

But there is one way of describing the

Roderick Chisholm, "Philosophy and Ordinary Language,"
Richard Rorty, op . cit
p. 179.
,

.
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philosopher's ^ordinary use of
ordinary words which is
especially apt for
Clarifying the relationship between
Hoore and the traditional
philosopher.
W9 may 8sy that tho philosopher
often uses words in unordinary

y

ca..

h.

is

eiTip.roaQ.ng

special philosophical criteria.

Often, tra-

ditional philosophers are rebuked
for using words in unordinary
ways.
Passmore says, "It is as if an
economist were to be rebuked for
overlooking
the fact that a person can 'demand'
something which he has no means of
paying for." He believes that most
philosophical statements are of the critoriologscal sort, that "they are emphatic
ways of pointing out that particular
philcsop..

si cissoria o, solidity, certainty,
clarity are never in fact

.i.ii.d.

If

a

philosopher says that we do not know
material-thing state-

ments for certain, we

car,

paraphrase him:

the evidence which we have for ma-

terial- thing statements doss not meet such
and such a criterion for certain

knowledge

Setting special criteria for knowledge is si milar to
proposing a
new meaning for "know,
ior.

or

"

but they are not the same thing,

letting a criterion

Knowledge is specifying a standard by which to judge whether
any item is
3.s

not an item of knowledge.

When we set up such a standard, it is likely

we oesire that others accept and employ our standard, or criterion.

Philos opnsrs rarely explicitly propose that others accept their criteria.

m

In fact,

some cases, they may not say or even be aware that they are cm-

pj. 0 y 2 .ng

special criteria.

criteria

,

But if they are aware that they are using special

they nay expect other philosophers to examine those things which

they considered and which influenced then to accept their criteria and to
’John Passmore, "Arguments to Meaninglessness, Excluded Opposites
and Paradigm Cases," Richard Rorty, on. cit
p. 189.
,

t

^

.

,
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cxeiaine these problems which arise
when other criteria are employed. 1

One may attempt to "reduce'

statement about language.

1

a criteriological statement to
some sort of

But such a reduction statement
m?y itself be

reduced to a criteriological statement.
of the lorn:

X meets such

"a is really Y."
and.

Reduction statements are often

But this statement may bo "reduced"
to:

such criteria for something's being
Y."

ihe reasons lor holding or accepting a
particular criterion

are various in

<-

tr ai

The empirical facts which philosophers are con~

corned with are very often facts about abnormal,
atypical, or novel situations

Consideration of atypical cases often points up

possible inadequacies and may suggest improvements in
our conceptualization of the "normal" cases.

By far the

greater number of important and interesting traditional

philosophical problems

... have

arisen out of these non-

paradigmatic cases which are either the re sults of scienti fic dis cove rs or of speculation along scientific
lines

,

Clearly, empirical facts do not dictate a criterion.

The fact that people

suffer hallucination suggests the possibility of being mistaken about

material- thing statements despite the usual immediate evidence.

Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Kn owle dge
a general discussion of the problem ofth? criterion.
2
"Grover Maxwell)

,

This

pp. 5S--69, for

arri Herbert Feig'l,
"V/hy Ordinary Language Leeds
Reforming," Richard Rorty, op, cit. pp. 195-6.
,
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similarity

of:

typical and atypical experience may
suggest a stiff cri-

terion of knowledge; and these facts
also show that according to
a
stiff criterion, v;e cannot be said
to know material-thing
statements.
On another level, there may be various
sorts of motives which

incline a philosopher toward a criterion.

He may conceive his enter-

prise to be one of saving morality in
the face of scientific claims, 1
or constructing a conceptual underpinning
for the sciences, 2 or work-

ing cut the philosophical consequences
of religious dogma, 5 or indicating, without use of dogma, the existence
4
of God,
or pointing toward a

method for the salvation of mankind, 5 -- or defending
common sense against

philosophical attack.
finally, on other levels, the philosopher’s work may
be sympto-

matic of subconscious tendencies, political leaning,
and religious up"

bi -.n^a.ng .

nG philosopher’s work is not immune from psychological,
socio-

logies, biographical, and historical analysis.

It is reasonable to be-

lievu tha o the philosopher ’s work is more open to such analysis than
is
the scientist’s.
3uo, in general, philosophy books differ from other books in

that special criteria are employed for deciding whether or not items
1 ^

'See Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Mew York:
no ole, Inc., liltf, pp» ^ e>— S 2

Barnes and

•

p

'Like Quine.

•3

''Note Anselm’s conception of his proof as a sort of conceptual
under-pinning for faith.

4

Like Berkley, Bradley, Jaspers and others.

5

Like Marx.

92

belong to the most general and
sometimes abstract categories.

The cri-

terion for something's being a material
object may be that its appearance is qualitatively different from
a delusive or illusory
appearance;
thus, certain items are said not to
be material objects.

The criterion

for something's being an event may be
that events take place within its

parts

items which are usually categorized

;

as

material objects are thus

categorized as events, or perhaps constructs
of events.

The criterion

for something's being known with certainty
may be that the thing can be

prove a

;

items such as that there are hands may not
be provable in a pres-

cribed manner.

They are not categorized as known with certainty.

And

philosophers may also have special criteria for items
being identical,
real, good, and so on,
Th - oi iteio.olcgical me ^philosophical thesis has two
important
1

virtues.

First, it helps explain why philosophical disputes continue

through the ages.

If philosophers are using different criteria, their

disputes about whether items are of a certain type cannot be resolved by

reference

l,o

solving ho ore

empirical facts.
'

s

Secondly, this thesis has the virtue of

paradox without raising a new one.

Philosophers are not

men holding inconsistent beliefs but rather men using different criteria
at different times.

One set of criteria is deemed sufficient for ordinary

life and another necessary for philosophical purposes.
is used in practice,

the other in theory,

dualism can be done without.

One set of criteria

Moore’s insight is that such a

The criteriological metaphilosophical thesis

suggests itself as at least the most handy one with which to both account

for traditional philosophy and illuminate Moore’s special contribution to
philosophy.

.
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I do noo here wish to get into a long
discussion on the virtues

and vices of traditional philosophy.

It is now almost a truism that the

form philosophical statements take is often
misleading as to their purport.

In "Philosophical Perplexity," Wisdom attempts
to give a short

account of the ways in which philosophy can be misleading. 1

Yet in "Moore's

Technique" he asks,
"V-lch

oi the

net

that on the covers of their books

they print the warning "Philosophy" and that so many
of them inside misuse language like this, is it
use?

a

mis-

2

Wisdom answers (obliquely) concerning statements which seem but, according
to him, do not go against common sense:
It’s middling to express oneself this way

and.

it may

temporarily confuse others and even oneself into sus-

pecting those everyday remarks
natural

,.

.It’s muddling, but it’s

3

That philosophers often convince themselves that they have proved astounding theses is well documented in the literature.

One example which both

Moore and Wisdom give is this statement of McTaggart's:

"Jo Matter is in

f,

the same position as the gorgons and the harpies
1

|:

John Wisdom, "Philosophical Perplexity,
lOkff.

on., cit,.,

2

‘-

,

"

Richard Eorty,

John Wisdom, "Moore's Technique," Paul A. S chi lop

,

_ou.

cit.,

p. *35.

3 Ibld,

,

p. 438.

He Taggart, Some Dogmas of Religion, Second Edition, p. 95»
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We naturally, with Moore, gasp at
such a statement.

We feel

tnat Moore must be right in saying that
at least sometimes some philosophers have meant their statements to be
paradoxical, to go against com-

mon sense.

Yet we nod to Wittgenstein's reaction upon
hearing Moore's

proof of an external world:

"Those philosophers who have denied the

existence, of Matter have not wished to deny
that under my trousers I

wear part:

.

The rhetorical device of emphasising what you are
saying

with striking remarks

'

oversteps the boundaries of sober discourse when

it reaches the heights (or depths) illustrated by
McTaggart’s statement.

Yet most traditional philosophical theories can be put in language
more
sober, though less exciting, than has been the practice.
Thus, Moore's defense of common sense is a good defense in the

sense that what he says seems true.

Some philosophers have meant to con-

found common sense, or thought that this is what they were doing.

lief that there are material objects, they have suggested,
ror.

The be

Is a common er

Or they have suggested that the belief that we know that there are

material objects is a common error.

They have given, or have been under,

impression that their criteria for an item being known or for an item being a material object are the same as the ordinary criteria.

being aware at some times that

their-

criteria are especially stiff, they

have ignored this fact at other times.
have used words in unordinary ways.

Or while

Alternately, we can say that they

They were not therefore recommending

usages nor were they recommending criteria.

Often, whether unaware of or

^Reported by John Wisdom, "Moore's Technique," Paul A. Schilpp,
op,

cit,

,

p. 431.

2

See John Passmore, "Arguments to Meaninglessness Excluded
Opposites, and Paradigm Cases," Richard Rorty, op. cit., p. I 89
,

.
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ignoring the fact that their
criteria are net the
criteria of common
-oi sc (or alternately
that their language is
not the language of ordinary usage), they have asserted,
e. g.,
do notknow that there are
,„aterial objects,
in the sense which Moore
calls ordinary, in
11

the sense:
ve humans we do not have good
evidence that there are hands,
soap bubbles, and telephone poles.
Patently, according to the
ordinary criteria
do have good evidence that these
things exist. When Moore shows
his
-a.,
n«, gives good evidence.
Moore, though, goes a step
further, in saying than we even have the sort
of evidence which the traditional
philos-

™

pher demands, although he acknowledges
that he cannot give this evidence.
3ti.t!

,

he stands by ordinary criteria in
claiming that we can know things
©
"

which we cannot prove.
But what has Moore to say to those
philosophers— or to philosophers in their more sober moments -who
do not mean to deny the existence
of Wittgenstein’s pants.

guage

or-

Explicitly, he says that they are misusing lan-

tha- taere is no good reason to accept
their theses, or that they

are really offering analyses which he
cannot accept.

has something of much more iiupo^nce (I

thin!.:)

career is a defense of the ordinary criteria.

But implicitly, he

to say.

Implicitly, Poore's

It is not that he is defend-

ing those criteria against attempts to have
then changed.
is defending those criteria as philosophica
lly relevant.

It is that he

He is

ex-

iplify-

uhe lac o teat or.e can do good philosophy with
those criteria and therefcg

sho.vj.ng

chat we have no good reason to be suspicious of common sense

oo-iiufs in general,

or of the knowledge which we ordinarily claim to have

about our environment.

Of all the critics in the Schilpp volume, Murphy

seems to have the best grasp of what Moore is about when he says,
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tno kind oX understanding and knowing
so far defended

are precisely the sort which a
philosophically compre-

hensive estimate of the world we live in
and our ways
c>x

i -biding

about it should have led us to exoect

oul.

in this situation.

Such knowing does not conform to

the pattern of clarity and certainty which a
philosopnen-

indent on reducing the world to logic or analys-

ing it into sensation would require, but it is
wholly

arbitrary and unreasonable to demand that it should.
Ana while it is not "final" as satisfying the epis-

temologist’s or metaphysician’s aspirations, it is
quii-e "ultimate" as a source of reliable and in some

cases certainly truthful information not otherwise

procurable about the world around us... Thus in defending common sense against its critics and exhibiting
once more its primacy and authentic cogency, Moore has

made an Important contribution to philosophical good
sense,*
The great conflict between philosophy and common sense which Moore

pictured as being largely a matter of disagreement on substantial issues is

really largely
schizophrenia.

criteriological split,

a

We might call it philosophical

It is misleading to suggest that philosophers have had con-

tradictory beliefs about proper usage.

Rather they have measured beliefs

by different standards, one for the streets, and another for the study.
Thus, they can say, yes, according to the ordinary criteria I know that I

^Arthur Murphy, "Moore’s ’Defence of Common Sense,'" Paul A.
ochilpp, op. cit
pp. 31 - 315 .
^

.

,

1

9?

have a hand, but according to the
philosophical criteria, alas, 1 do not
know that material objects are real.
It may be that some philosophers

haVG held contradictory beliefs about which
are the correct criteria.
It scorns to me that for the most part they
have believed that their philo-

sophical criteria are correct, their ordinary
criteria incorrect though

useful in everyday intercourse and perhaps
inevitable.
frotc the

Hume retreats

"delirium” of philosophy to friendly merriment
and conversation

wherein he finds himself determined to live, talk,
and act like other
ple in the common •affairs of life.

peo-

But he returns to philosophy thereby

reaffirmed in his sceptical principles.

It is not that he has different

beliefs about correct usage or correct criteria, but that he uses dif-

ferent criteria, one set for the "cold and strain’d" speculation of philosop- ‘J

t

a no uher ror seo±a^_ merriment and amusement.

VJhat .loore

has shown is

that this philosophical schizophrenia is not inevitable, that philosophy
and common sense can live together in harmony, and that for the sake of

intellectual peace (and clarity), they should.
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